University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2011

CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
USING TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS
Santosh Chandrasekhar
University of Kentucky, san@netlab.uky.edu

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Chandrasekhar, Santosh, "CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES USING
TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS" (2011). University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations. 162.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/162

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Santosh Chandrasekhar

The Graduate School
University of Kentucky
2011

CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES USING
TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Engineering
at the University of Kentucky

By
Santosh Chandrasekhar
Lexington, Kentucky
Director:

Dr. Mukesh Singhal

Lexington, Kentucky
2011
Copyright c

Santosh Chandrasekhar 2011

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CONSTRUCTION OF EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES USING
TRAPDOOR HASH FUNCTIONS
In large-scale distributed systems, where adversarial attacks can have widespread impact,
authentication provides protection from threats involving impersonation of entities and
tampering of data. Practical solutions to authentication problems in distributed systems
must meet specific constraints of the target system, and provide a reasonable balance
between security and cost. The goal of this dissertation is to address the problem of building
practical and efficient authentication mechanisms to secure distributed applications. This
dissertation presents techniques to construct efficient digital signature schemes using
trapdoor hash functions for various distributed applications. Trapdoor hash functions are
collision-resistant hash functions associated with a secret trapdoor key that allows the keyholder to find collisions between hashes of different messages. The main contributions of
this dissertation are as follows:
1. A common problem with conventional trapdoor hash functions is that revealing a
collision producing message pair allows an entity to compute additional collisions
without knowledge of the trapdoor key. To overcome this problem, we design an
efficient trapdoor hash function that prevents all entities except the trapdoor keyholder from computing collisions regardless of whether collision producing message
pairs are revealed by the key-holder.
2. We design a technique to construct efficient proxy signatures using trapdoor hash
functions to authenticate and authorize agents acting on behalf of users in agentbased computing systems. Our technique provides agent authentication, assurance
of agreement between delegator and agent, security without relying on secure
communication channels and control over an agent’s capabilities.
3. We develop a trapdoor hash-based signature amortization technique for authenticating
real-time, delay-sensitive streams. Our technique provides independent verifiability of
blocks comprising a stream, minimizes sender-side and receiver-side delays, minimizes
communication overhead, and avoids transmission of redundant information.
4. We demonstrate the practical efficacy of our trapdoor hash-based techniques for
signature amortization and proxy signature construction by presenting discrete log-

based instantiations of the generic techniques that are efficient to compute, and
produce short signatures.
Our detailed performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed schemes outperform
existing schemes in computation cost and signature size. We also present proofs for security
of the proposed discrete-log based instantiations against forgery attacks under the discretelog assumption.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation presents techniques for constructing efficient and scalable digital
signature schemes using trapdoor hash functions [3, 4, 26, 44, 74] that are designed for
providing authentication in emerging large-scale distributed systems.
A distributed system consists of multiple autonomous processing and storage elements
that communicate through any form of communication network to provide a common
service that covers all aspects of computing and information access. Distributed systems
are designed for a myriad of purposes that can include providing resource access to a
large number of clients in a transparent, open and scalable manner, and for processing
complex and resource intensive programs in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The
commercialization of the Internet and the subsequent development of new distributed
computing technologies have revolutionized the manner in which governments, business
organizations and academic institutions operate and offer their services to clients. Today
emerging distributed systems like storage area networks, Cloud computing, and content
delivery networks (CDNs) are at the forefront of technologies that are transforming the
paradigm of how information is accessed, processed and stored.
Existing technologies like CDN and Cloud computing continue to evolve.

We can

attribute the evolution of these systems to two lines of research: (1) development of new
frameworks and architectures for improving utilization and efficiency; and (2) designing new
or transforming existing applications that can benefit from deployment in these emerging
systems. Part of the research effort that is driving the evolution of distributed computing
technologies is in the field of security. Large-scale distributed systems that are designed
to provide services to a large group of users also provide a platform for adversarial users
to launch a myriad of attacks with widespread consequences, impacting a large number of
components and clients. Moreover, as the number of clients that use distributed computing
systems for sensitive tasks (like Internet-based monetary transactions) continue to grow,
the cost of attacks due to lack of security measures is increasing as well. Researchers
have identified several security threats in systems like CDN and Cloud computing that
must be protected against to avoid the large costs of successful attacks. For instance, new
applications and architectures for Cloud computing need to address security issues related
1

to isolation management, multi-tenancy, data exposure, virtual OS security, encryption of
data at rest and in transit, service level agreements (SLAs) to obtain Cloud security, trust
and compliance issues, among several other security requirements.
Security in distributed systems is a broad area of research that entails authentication,
authorization, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Authentication forms an important
part of the spectrum of solutions for protecting network-based operations as well as supporting underlying infrastructure. Authentication allows an entity to establish the legitimacy of
a claimed property to another entity. Authentication helps prevent impersonation attacks
where an adversary masquerades as a victim’s intended communication partner to send
malicious data to or receive sensitive information from the victim, and allows the victim to
detect malicious tampering of data sent from the intended source. Authentication schemes
can provide protection against identity theft or privacy breaches, malware distribution,
routing disruptions and copyright infringements, among many other threats. We can use
several well-known mechanisms to provide authentication with varying degree of security,
performance and features which include password-based techniques, message authentication
codes [30], integrity codes [18] and digital signatures [77]. Digital signatures are public key
cryptographic schemes that are primarily used for message authentication, and also provide
non-repudiation and integrity assurance. Digital signature is among the most popular
technique for providing authentication in current computer systems. We can attribute
the popularity of digital signatures to their use in the generation of digital certificates,
an important component of a public key infrastructure, that are extensively employed to
provide entity authentication for organizations wishing to provide secure access to their web
servers. Digital signatures also play an important role in authenticating electronic mail,
software distribution, financial transactions, and electronic documents of legal significance.
Conventional digital signature schemes, like RSA and DSA [77], are designed to
authenticate a single message exchanged between two communicating parties. In distributed
systems, data can be stored, processed and routed among multiple locations during the
process of an application workflow. In many distributed applications, using conventional
digital signatures to authenticate messages can lead to high computation and communication overhead. Examples include applications where the same message is manipulated
by multiple entities (e.g., routing using the Border Gateway Protocol), a large number of
messages need to be processed by a single entity (e.g., processing feedback in multicast
applications) or only a portion of the message that needs to be authenticated is available
at the sender at the time of transmission (e.g., distribution of real-time content).
2

A

commercially viable security solution must achieve a reasonable balance between security
and cost. The design and construction of authentication schemes must take into account
the architecture of the target system and must be tailored towards meeting the specific
constraints of the target system to provide a good balance between security and cost. The
design of digital signatures must also continuously evolve to tackle new security threats in
emerging design and applications of modern distributed systems.
1.1

Research motivation

Cryptographic hash functions are an important building block for a large number of security
schemes. Cryptographic hash functions are extensively used for the following purposes: (1)
Construction of message authentication codes that can be used for providing data integrity,
symmetric data origin authentication, and identification in symmetric-key schemes; (2)
Securing password-based authentication protocols from exposure and dictionary attacks;
(3) Construction of key derivation function for generating secret keys in key agreement
protocols, like Secure Sockets Layer, and; (4) Generation of universally unique identifier
that is used to uniquely identify information in distributed systems.
Digital signature schemes employ hash functions for message compression, providing
message integrity, non-repudiation and to prevent forgery [60]. In most digital signature
schemes, the first step before signing a message is to compute a hash of the message.
Next, the hash value of the message is signed in place of the original message. This
technique is called the hash-then-sign paradigm. Digital signature schemes require the
hash function to be collision resistant, pre-image resistant and second pre-image resistant.
Replacing the standard cryptographic hash function with a different cryptographic primitive
during generation of digital signatures can lead to new forms of signature schemes with
desirable properties. For instance, by generating a signature on a redundancy function of
the message, we obtain a signature scheme providing message recovery that can be used to
eliminate the communication cost of transmitting the message along with the signature. By
generating a signature on a message encrypted using the receiver’s public key, we obtain a
signcryption scheme that can be used for authenticated transfer of encrypted messages. We
use this “hash-replacement” technique as our motivation to develop new forms of digital
signature schemes that use trapdoor hash functions instead of conventional cryptographic
hash functions to compute the message digest before signing.
Trapdoor hash functions are collision-resistant hash functions associated with a special
trapdoor key that enables the possessor of the key to find collisions between hashes of
3

different messages. Informally, a (trapdoor) collision occurs when two distinct messages
have the same (trapdoor) hash value, in which case, the messages are called a collisionproducing message pair. A trapdoor hash function is associated to a (private, public) key
pair, also referred to as a (trapdoor, hash) key pair. An entity computes trapdoor hash
value of a message using the hash key. Collisions are computationally infeasible to find (or
compute) without the knowledge of the trapdoor key. However, given the trapdoor key
along with the trapdoor hash on a message, it is feasible to find a collision with another
given message. When a trapdoor hash function is used within a hash-then-sign signature
scheme, it permits the party with knowledge of the trapdoor to re-use the signature value to
authenticate other messages of choice by finding collisions between the hash of the original
signed-message and the new message that needs to be signed. Depending on the efficiency
of the trapdoor hash function, this technique of authenticating messages can offer several
potential benefits: (1) The computation cost of generating a signature can be reduced
to the cost of finding collisions; (2) The cost of verifying a signature can be reduced to
comparing two hash values; (3) The communication cost of transmitting authenticating
information pertaining to a message can be reduced to the size of the trapdoor hash value.
We experiment with various techniques of using the collision finding property of trapdoor
hash functions to develop authentication schemes that offer performance advantages over
existing schemes while providing security guarantees against forgery attacks.
1.2

Thesis contributions

In this dissertation we introduce new techniques to construct various forms of digital
signature schemes using trapdoor hash functions that are suitable for solving emerging
security issues related to authentication in modern distributed systems. The general idea
behind our techniques is that, rather than generating conventional signatures on a message
using a secret key, we use the process of computing hash collisions using a trapdoor key
to authenticate messages. Our contributions include the following: (1) We present generic
techniques to construct proxy signatures and stream authentication schemes using trapdoor
hash functions. Our proposed generic techniques allow the choice of cryptosystem and
primitives for implementation, open to future improvements; (2) We present instantiations
of our generic constructions using primitives from the discrete log-based cryptosystem to
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed techniques in building practical instances; (3) We
evaluate the performance of the proposed discrete log-based signature constructions in terms
of communication, computation and storage costs and compare it with existing schemes in
4

the literature; (4) We conduct an extensive analysis of the security of the proposed signature
schemes where we examine the most general mathematical assumptions that are conjectured
to be hard, like the discrete log (DL) assumption, and aim to deduce relations between such
assumptions and hardness of forging the proposed signatures. Next we elaborate on the
specific contributions of this dissertation.
1.2.1

Building an efficient key-exposure-resistant trapdoor hash function

Trapdoor hash functions have been primarily used in the past to construct non-interactive
non-transferable signature schemes called chameleon signatures [44]. Chameleon signatures
are verifiable by no one other than the intended recipient.

The general idea behind

chameleon signatures is to have the signer compute the trapdoor hash of a message m using
the hash key of the recipient and sign the resulting digest. If the recipient uses its trapdoor
key and computes a hash collision between the original signed message m and a second
message m′ to obtain a forged signature on m′ , to provide non-repudiation, the signer must
be able to demonstrate this forgery to a third party. This is typically done by the signer
revealing a third message, m′′ that has the same trapdoor hash value as m′ (or m). The
ability of a signer to demonstrate forgery by a receiver requires a trapdoor hashing scheme
that allows an entity to compute a trapdoor hash collision with a third message given two
messages that result in a collision of their respective trapdoor hash values. However, this
property of trapdoor hash value is undesirable when used for authenticating new messages
as we explain next.
In this dissertation, we present new techniques to build various forms of digital signatures
using trapdoor hash functions. We base our constructions on a central idea that given a
message, m, a trapdoor hash of m computed using the signer’s hash key, and a signature
σ on the trapdoor hash of m computed using signer’s secret (signing) key, the signer can
authenticate a new message m′ by computing a hash collision between m and m′ using its
(secret) trapdoor key. Any entity that has previously verified σ on m and wishes to check
the authenticity of m′ , simply checks whether the trapdoor hash values of m and m′ are
equal. This collision based technique to authenticate messages requires that given m and
m′ , it is computationally infeasible for the receiver, or any other third party, to compute
m′′ that has the same trapdoor hash value as m′ (and consequently, m as well) — existing
trapdoor hashing schemes [3, 4, 26, 44, 74] were not designed to provide this requirement.
We present a new discrete log-based trapdoor hash function that possesses the required
security and performance characteristics to serve as a building block in the construction of
5

proposed digital signatures schemes. The proposed trapdoor hash function uses ephemeral
keys for collision computation and never allows a third party to compute additional trapdoor
hash collisions given collision producing message pairs. We provide formal definitions of
trapdoor hash functions and their security properties for schemes that use ephemeral keys
for collision computation. We present a detailed theoretical analysis, including correctness,
security and performance, of the proposed trapdoor hashing scheme.
1.2.2

Proxy signatures for authenticating agents in agent-based computing
systems

Today, many large-scale and complex distributed systems like peer-to-peer networks,
pervasive and ubiquitous computing environments, Cloud systems, and Grids are highly
dynamic, decentralized and loosely coupled with constituent components that are spread
throughout a network. Researchers have advocated agent-based computing as the natural
computational model for such systems [40]. Agents are software instances that can be
delegated by a user to carry out operations on its behalf. However, use of agent-based
computing in multi-Cloud, Grid and other distributed systems opens up new avenues for
adversarial users to compromise the system. Security in Clouds and other computing
systems heavily rely on establishing trust relationships among the actors involved. In agentbased computing, users have to establish trust relationships with agents which includes their
security, reliability, availability, and business continuity guarantees. Moreover, sensitive
information stored and processed by agents need to be protected from exposure, alteration
and corruption. We study the problem of providing efficient authentication of agents in
agent-based computing environments.
Proxy signatures have found extensive use in providing message authentication for
agents acting on behalf of users in applications such as Grid computing, communications
systems, personal digital assistants, information management, and e-commerce. Importance
of proxy signatures has been repeatedly highlighted by applied cryptographers through
different variations, namely, threshold proxy signatures, blind proxy signatures and so
forth. Unfortunately, most recent constructions of proxy signatures only improve on minor
weaknesses of previously built schemes, and most often do not deliver formal security
guarantees.
We propose a technique to construct provably secure proxy signature schemes using
trapdoor hash functions that can be used to authenticate and authorize agents acting on
behalf of users in agent-based computing systems. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach for creating practical instances by constructing a discrete log-based instantiation of
6

the proposed generic technique that achieves superior performance in terms of verification
overhead and signature size compared to existing proxy signature schemes. We provide
formal definitions, security specifications, and a detailed theoretical analysis, including
correctness, security and performance, of the proposed proxy signature scheme.
1.2.3

A trapdoor hash based mechanism for stream authentication

Large number of activities in the Internet, like distribution of digital audio, video, software,
games, stock quotes and live news feeds, involve transmission of digital streams.

In

such applications, the end-user’s tolerance for high latency, low data rates and playback
interruption is small. This means individual components of the stream (like audio or video
frames) need to be processed upon reception, with minimal delay, before the entire stream is
received. To protect such delay-sensitive digital streams against malicious attacks, security
mechanisms need to be designed to process long sequence of bits in an efficient manner that
allows the receiver to verify the security of individual components of the stream without
excessive delays. This is typically done by dividing the stream into smaller blocks and using
a security mechanism to secure each block comprising the stream.
We study the problem of efficient authentication for real-time and delay-sensitive data
streams commonly seen in content distribution, multicast and peer-to-peer networks. We
propose a novel signature amortization technique based on trapdoor hash functions for authenticating individual data blocks that comprise a digital stream. Our technique represents
a radical departure from traditional approaches for amortizing signatures and provides the
following features: (1) Resilience against arbitrary transmission losses of intermediate blocks
in the stream without affecting verifiability of remaining blocks; (2) Small and constant
memory/compute requirements at the sender and receiver for authenticating a stream;
(3) Minimal constant communication overhead needed for transmission of authenticating
information along with the stream; (4) No wasted bandwidth due to redundant transmission
of authenticating information. Our proposed technique makes authentication of streams
practical and efficient. We substantiate this claim by constructing a discrete-log based
instantiation of the proposed technique. The discrete log-based scheme provides adaptive
stream verification, where the receiver has control over modulating computation cost
versus buffer size. Our performance analysis demonstrates that the proposed discrete logbased scheme incurs the least per-block communication and signature generation overheads
compared to existing schemes with comparable features.
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1.3

Thesis organization

In Chapter 2, we provide description of common cryptographic concepts and terminologies
relevant to the thesis. We present background information on discrete log-based digital
signatures and trapdoor hash functions that are used as building blocks to construct the
proposed authentication schemes. We discuss related research on applications of trapdoor
hash functions, proxy signatures and stream authentication using digital signatures. In
Chapter 3, we present a novel discrete log-based trapdoor hashing scheme that provides
all necessary security and performance properties that make it suitable for use as a
building block in the construction of the proposed signature schemes. Chapter 4 presents
a technique to construct proxy signatures using trapdoor hash functions along with a
discrete log-based instantiation of the proposed technique that can be used for providing
efficient authentication of agents in agent-based computing systems. Chapter 5 presents
a technique for signature amortization using trapdoor hash functions followed by a
discrete log-based instantiation of the proposed technique that can be used for providing
efficient authentication of real-time and delay-sensitive streams. Chapter 6 concludes the
dissertation with a summary of key research contributions and possible research directions
in the area of efficient authentication protocols.
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Chapter 2

Background and related work

In this chapter, we present a brief introduction to common cryptographic concepts
and terminologies, provide a technical description of trapdoor hash functions and digital
signatures along with their security properties. We also discuss related research work
on application of trapdoor hash functions, development of proxy signatures, and flow
authentication mechanisms.
2.1

Cryptographic concepts and terminologies

Authentication:

Authentication is the process by which an entity establishes a claimed

property to another entity. For example, an entity claiming a legitimate use of a
service, or an entry to a system, can establish the claimed legitimacy through use of
authentication. The notion of authentication can be further categorized into entity
authentication and message authentication.
Entity authentication is a process of verifying that an entity’s identity is as claimed
through acquisition of some evidence and, that the authenticated entity was active
at the time the evidence was created or acquired. A successful entity authentication
results in a belief held by the verifier that the authenticated entity possesses the
claimed identity.
Message authentication (or data-origin authentication) is the process of verifying
whether a message is from a purported source and involves identifying the source
of a message.

If the message has been modified by an entity which is not the

purported source, message authentication should fail. Thus, message authentication
provides implicit message integrity. Authentication is based on the possession of
some secret information which is known only to the entities participating in the
authentication.

The basis of authentication can be classified into the following

categories: (1) Something you know, like passwords and cryptographic keys; (2)
Something you are, like biometric retinal scans and fingerprints, and; (3) Something
you posses, like smartcards and physical keys.
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One-way trapdoor function:

A one-way trapdoor function, fk : D 7→ R is a function

which is easy to evaluate for all x ∈ D and difficult to invert for almost all values in
R. However, if the trapdoor information k is known, then for all values y ∈ R, it is
easy to compute x ∈ D satisfying y = fk (x).
Negligible function:

A negligible function diminishes to 0 faster than the reciprocal of

any polynomial. In cryptography, the security of a scheme is judged according to
whether the probability of security failure of the scheme is negligible in terms of the
cryptographic key length. A function f (n) : N 7→ R is said to be a negligible quantity
in n if, for any polynomial p(n), there exists a natural number n0 such that, for all
n > n0 ,

1
f (n)

> p(n), i.e., reciprocal of f (n) is unbounded by any polynomial function

of n.
Probabilistic Polynomial Time:

Deterministic algorithms follow the same sequence of

operations each time they execute with the same input. By contrast, randomized
algorithms make random decisions at certain points during their execution; hence
their execution paths may differ each time they execute with the same input. The
random decisions are based upon the outcome of a random number generator. While
some random moves lead to a correct result, others lead to incorrect results. A PPT
algorithm is a randomized algorithm with bounded error probability whose running
time for each input is a polynomial function of the input size. The error probability
is determined from its input of randomness.
Computational infeasibility:

A computationally feasible problem is a problem that can

be solved by an efficient algorithm, i.e., a deterministic or randomized algorithm with
execution time expressed as a polynomial function of the input size. Computationally
feasible problems can be solved using resources that are manageable, even if the
size of the problem is large. All problems that are not computationally feasible are
called computationally infeasible. An entity, armed with a polynomial-time algorithm,
cannot solve most instances of a computationally infeasible problem with manageable
resources. An efficient algorithm for solving a computationally feasible problem need
not be efficient in a practical sense because the degree of the polynomial that bounds
its time complexity is simply too large. Also, algorithms with non-polynomial time
complexities can be useful for solving small instances of computationally infeasible
problems efficiently. Practically efficient algorithms are polynomial-time algorithms
where the polynomials have very small degrees. In this dissertation, we sometimes
10

use the term “efficient” to mean “computable (or solvable) by a practically efficient
algorithm”.
Provable Security:

Cryptographic protocols or schemes are built using atomic primi-

tives, like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or one-way functions, that are based
on mathematical problems conjectured to be hard. Security assurances provided by
cryptographic protocols rely on the confidence in the security of the underlying primitives. A limited viewpoint in cryptography regards the security of a cryptographic
protocol to be equivalent to solving the underlying mathematical problem. However,
many attacks on cryptographic schemes succeed, not by cryptanalyzing the underlying
primitive, but rather by finding a weakness in the protocol design [10, 12].
The reductionist security argument provides a means to researchers to, in a sense,
“provably” demonstrate the security of a cryptographic protocol. The idea of a
reductionist security argument is as follows: Assume that the goal is to provide
authentication via digital signatures. The first step is to describe a formal adversarial
model and define what it means for a signature scheme to be secure. Based on the
model and security definition, a particular scheme can be analyzed against attacks
from the point of view of satisfying the definition. Eventually, one proves that the
scheme is secure via a reduction showing that anyone who has an algorithm to mount
a successful attack on the signature scheme, can use the same algorithm to solve the
underlying mathematical problem (that is used as the basis for the claimed security
of the signature scheme) with relatively little additional effort. This type of security
proof allows cryptanalysts to focus on studying the security of the atomic primitive (or
the hardness of underlying mathematical problem) rather than directly cryptanalyzing
a security protocol — if cryptanalysts were to find a weakness in the protocol, they
would have discovered a weakness in the underlying atomic primitive. Moreover, if the
underlying atomic primitive is known to be secure (or the underlying mathematical
problem is hard), we can deduce, without further cryptanalysis, that the protocol is
secure. For a reductionist security argument to hold, a formal notion of security of
the underlying atomic primitive is required.
Random Oracle Model:

A central step in proving the security of a cryptographic

protocol using the reductionist security argument is to describe an adversarial
model.

An adversarial model describes the means, capabilities and goals of an

adversary acting against the target cryptographic protocol. Important components
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of an adversarial model include abstraction of the communication channels and
formalization of mathematical objects, like infinite random strings and oracles. Models
used for proving the security of a cryptographic protocol include the standard model,
generic group model and the random oracle model. The standard model does not
use any special mathematical objects and assumes existence of a reliable but insecure
communication channel. Proofs in the standard model are typically unappealing [63]
and lead to protocol constructions that are inefficient in practise [10]. The generic
group model assumes that non-trivial properties of the representation of the elements
of an algebraic structure (e.g. a group) under consideration cannot be exploited [58].
The generic group model provides the adversary with a random encoding of the
algebraic structure and oracle to answer permissible operations in the algebraic
structure [76]. Generic group models are typically used for computing the lower
bounds on the complexity of mathematical problems conjectured to be hard (like the
discrete log problem) that form the basis of several cryptosystems using algorithms
that only make use of operations in the algebraic structure and do not consider the
encoding of the elements of the algebraic structure.
The random oracle model is a popular choice in the security research community to
obtain security results for many efficient and practical schemes that are constructed
using hash functions. In the random oracle model, the behavior of a hash function is
emulated by a deterministic and efficient function that outputs uniformly distributed
random values. All entities including the adversary, are given access to the random
oracle OH that behaves as follows: The oracle OH initializes an empty list L. The list
L stores tuples of the form (mi , hi ), where mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ are queries and hi ∈ {0, 1}n
are random answers. For efficiency the list L can be sorted by mi . When an entity
queries OH with a value mi , the oracle searches the list L for the tuple (mi , hi ). If
the oracle finds the tuple, OH returns hi as the answer. If not, the oracle chooses a
random value hi ∈ {0, 1}n , stores (mi , hi ) (at an appropriate location) in the list L
and returns hi as the answer. Random oracles do not exist in practise. In the realworld, hash functions only emulate the random oracle behavior to a precision where
the difference is preferably a negligible quantity. However, if hash functions used in
a cryptographic scheme or protocol have no “obvious” flaw, then a security proof for
such a scheme using their idealized version can be considered as a useful test-bed
for checking the security of the scheme or protocol. Today, designing a cryptographic
scheme so that it is argued to be secure in the random oracle model is widely accepted
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as a good engineering principle.
2.2

Digital signatures

A digital signature is a cryptographic mechanism to provide authentication, message
integrity and non-repudiation. The process of signing entails transforming the message
and some secret information held by the entity into a tag, called a signature. This signature
provides a means for an entity to bind some information regarding itself (e.g., its identity) to
the message that is signed, and prove ownership of a message to another entity. A signature
is authentic if it was indeed created by the specified entity.
Most digital signature schemes employ hash functions for message compression,
providing message integrity, non-repudiation and for preventing forgery [60]. Formally a
digital signature scheme can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.1. A digital signature scheme DS is the tuple hParGen, KeyGen, SigGen,
SigVeri whose components are defined as follows:
ParGen: A PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs system
public parameters params.
KeyGen: A PPT algorithm that takes system parameters params as input and outputs a
(private, public) key pair (SK, P K).
SigGen: A PPT algorithm that takes system parameters params, a message m and a secret
key SK as inputs and outputs a signature σ on m.
SigVer: A deterministic algorithm that takes system parameters params, public key P K,
message m and a candidate signature σ on m as inputs and outputs Valid or Invalid.

A signature σ on a message m signed using SK is said to be authentic or valid under
P K if it passes the verification procedure, i.e., SigVer with params, σ, m and P K as inputs,
outputs Valid. We say that (m, σ) is a valid (message, signature) pair under public key P K.
2.2.1

Security of digital signatures

Let (SK, P K) represent the (private, public) key pair of an arbitrary entity E. A forged
signature σ on a message m is one that is valid under public key P K where E never
signed the message m. The goal of an adversary A is to forge signatures that appear to be
generated by some other entity E. Security of digital signatures is judged by their ability
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to resist signature forgery by relying on the difficulty of solving some well-known problem
such as the DL problem and the integer factorization problem.
A forgery can be either a total break, selective forgery or an existential forgery. A total
break occurs when an adversary is able to compute the private key of the signer. Selective
forgery allows an adversary to create a valid signature on a message chosen by or known to
the adversary beforehand. Existential forgery occurs when an adversary is able to forge a
signature on some message, where the adversary has little or no control over the message
on which the signature forgery is obtained.
An adversary can launch the following two-types of attacks to forge signatures:
1. Key-only attack: An adversary knows only the signers public key P K.
2. Message attack: An adversary is able to obtain valid (message, signature) pairs for a
set of messages that are known to or chosen by the adversary. Message attacks can
be further classified into the following three categories:
(a) Known-message attack: An adversary obtains a set of valid (message, signature)
pairs, where the messages are known to the adversary but not chosen by it.
(b) Chosen-message attack: An adversary obtains a set of valid (message, signature)
pairs, where the messages are chosen by the adversary before any signatures are
obtained.
(c) Adaptive chosen-message attack: An adversary is allowed to use the signer as
an oracle and request signatures on messages which are chosen by the adversary.
The choice of messages can depend on the signer’s public key or previous signed
messages.
In principle, an adaptive chosen-message attack, where the adversary attempts to forge
a signature by using the signer as an oracle and requesting signatures on messages of
choice, is the most difficult to prevent. Advantage of an adversary in forging a signature
is the probability that the adversary outputs a valid forgery. A signature scheme is said
to be secure if there exists no PPT forger that breaks the scheme with non-negligible
advantage. A detailed discussion on the types of attacks on digital signatures and their
security considerations can be found in [60].
2.2.2

Discrete log-based signatures

Primitives from DL-based cryptosystems have been extensively employed in the construction
of a large number of security protocols. These include the ElGamal [32] signature schemes
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and its variants [38], ElGamal encryption [32] and Diffie Hellman [27] key exchange and
its derivatives. The security of these protocols rely on the intractability of the discrete log
problem. The DL problem and assumption can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.2. Let p and q be primes such that q | (p − 1), whose sizes are determined
by a security parameter λ. Let α be an element of order q in Z∗p that generates the unique
cyclic subgroup G of Z∗p of order q. The DL Problem in G can be defined as follows: Given
(p, q, α ∈ Z∗p , β ∈ G), find an index k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q − 1, such that β = αk mod p or determine
that there is no such index.
Let A be a PPT algorithm that solves the DL problem in G. Define the advantage of
∗
k
the DL solver A as: AdvDL
A (λ) = P r[A(p, q, α, β) = k | α ∈R Zp , 0 ≤ k ≤ q − 1, β = α

mod p], where the notation ∈R denotes “randomly chosen from”. The probability is over
the random choices of α, k, the size of security parameter λ, and the input of randomness
for the algorithm A.
DL Assumption: The cyclic subgroup G satisfies the DL Assumption if AdvDL
A (λ) is a
negligible function.
The ElGamal family of signatures continue to be one of the most efficient signature
schemes in terms of storage overhead, signature size and computation cost. Moreover,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) adopted a specific variant of
ElGamal (DSA) for use in their Digital Signature Standard (DSS), specified in FIPS 186
and adopted in 1993 [77]. Other popular signature schemes within this family include the
provably secure Schnorr variant [72], and Nyberg-Rueppel family of signature schemes with
message recovery [64].
System public parameters, common to all variants of ElGamal, are chosen as params =
hp, q, αi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively, q | p − 1, and α is
an element of order q in Z∗p . The long-term (private, public) key pair of an entity is given
by (x, X), where x ∈R Z∗q and X = αx ∈ Z∗p . To sign a message m, an entity first chooses
an ephemeral private key k ∈R Z∗q and computes ephemeral public key r = αk mod q.
Next, the entity computes the signature value t by solving a signing equation that can be
expressed in the generalized form as:
±A ≡ ±xB ± kC

mod q

The quantities, A, B and C permute over H(m), r and t individually, or over functions
f (·, ·), g(·, ·) of (m, r), (m, t) and (r, t), and unity, where, H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q is a cryptographic
hash function. The parameter t together with r constitute the resulting signature σ = ht, ri
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on m. The signature σ on m can be verified under public key X by checking whether
the equivalence, αA ≡ X B r C mod p, holds. The functions f : {0, 1}∗ × Z∗q 7→ Z∗q and
g : Z∗q × Z∗q 7→ Z∗q are carefully chosen so that the signing equation can be solved for t, the
essence of the signature. For the DSA variant, A = H(m), B = r, C = t, and verification
?

involves checking whether αH(m) ≡ X r r t mod q holds.
In this dissertation we present instantiations of various forms of trapdoor hash-based
signature schemes using a particular variant of the ElGamal family of signatures, called the
Schnorr signature scheme [72]. Denoted as DL-Schnorr, the Schnorr signature scheme can
be described as follows:
DL-Schnorr.ParGen: Entities choose and agree upon common system public parameters
params = hp, q, α, Hi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively,
q | p − 1, α is an element of order q in Z∗p and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q is a cryptographic
hash function.
DL-Schnorr.KeyGen: An entity uses the system public parameters params, to generate its
private and public key pair, (SK, P K) = (x, X), where x ∈R Z∗q and X = αx ∈ Z∗p .
DL-Schnorr.SigGen: Given a message m ∈ 0, 1∗ , an entity uses its private key SK = x and
executes the following:
1. Choose an ephemeral private key k ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral public key as r = αk mod q.
2. Solve for the signature value t in the equation, t ≡ xH(m||r) + k mod q, where
m||r denotes the concatenation of r to m.
The entity outputs σ = ht, ri as the resulting signature on message, m.
DL-Schnorr.SigVer: To verify a signature σ on m under public key X, an entity executes
the following:
1. Parse σ as the tuple ht, ri and compute h = H(m||r).
2. Compute r ′ = αt X −h mod q.
If r ≡ r ′ mod q, then σ is a valid signature on m and the entity outputs V alid. Else,
verification fails and the entity outputs Invalid.
Security of the Schnorr signature scheme against forgery is based on the following wellknown theorem [70].
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Theorem 2.2.1. The Schnorr variant [72] of the ElGamal family of signatures is secure
against an adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model under the discrete
logarithm assumption.
2.2.3

Proxy signatures

The concept of a proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al. [57]. Proxy delegation
is a process by which an entity, the delegator, transfers its signing rights and capabilities
to another entity, the proxy. Following delegation, the proxy can generate signatures,
called proxy signatures on behalf of the delegator. Mambo et al. [57] classified proxy
delegation into partial delegation, full delegation and delegation by warrant, presented
possible constructions for proxy signatures, and provided an informal security analysis.
Later classifications of proxy signatures included partial delegation by warrant [43], and
strong/weak proxy signatures [47].
Since their introduction, researchers have focused on developing new proxy signatures
by enhancing the security or efficiency of previous schemes, but only relying on heuristic
security arguments [6, 45, 65, 78, 79]. Motivated by this, Boldyreva et al. [13] proposed the
first formal security notion for proxy signature schemes and presented a provably secure
variant of Kim et al.’s scheme [43]. Later, Lee et al. [48] analyzed the necessity of secure
channels in proxy signature schemes like [47, 57, 69, 43]. Malkin et al. [56] extended the
model by Boldyreva et al. for one level of delegation, to fully hierarchical proxy signatures
and proved the equivalence of proxy signatures and key-insulated signatures [28]. Zhang et
al. [83] proposed the first proxy signature scheme based on bilinear pairings in elliptic and
hyperelliptic curves. More recently, Schuldt et al. [73] proposed a stronger security model
compared to models by Boldyreva et al. [13] and Malkin et al. [56], and presented a generic
construction of a provably secure proxy signature scheme based on sequential aggregate
signatures in their stronger security model.
Proxy signatures have found extensive use in solving authentication issues in mobile
agent applications where autonomous software agents need to migrate across heterogeneous
execution environments and reliably perform transactions in electronic commerce [13, 47,
46]. Delegation of rights is also common in providing authorization for delegated entities
in distributed systems and for workflow management of information systems [5]. Leiwo et
al. [49] proposed a means to authenticate state alterations in distributed shared objects
using proxy signatures. Leiwo et al. [49] used the scenario of free software distribution
to show how proxy signatures could be used by core group members to sign update
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state messages on behalf of the administrator. Ahn et al. [1] proposed integration of
a role-based delegation framework [7] in pervasive computing environments to provide
selective information sharing while minimizing the risks of unauthorized access. Proxy
signatures have potential application in securing such access delegation systems to provide
authentication and non-repudiation in addition to access control. Proxy signatures can also
be used to provide authentication of user proxies in Grids [31, 80].
2.2.4

Signature-based stream authentication techniques

Conventional techniques for message authentication require the sender and the receiver to
have the ability to store the entire message before authenticating the message. However,
in many instances, like transmission of audio, video, live news feeds, stock quotes and
other forms of digital content, the message is split into smaller blocks, and individual
blocks in the stream need to be authenticated upon reception with minimal delay before
the entire stream is received [33].

Researchers have proposed several techniques for

stream (or flow) authentication that aim at reducing the computation and communication
overhead associated with securing individual blocks that comprise a stream.

These

techniques can be divided into MAC-based schemes like Timed Efficient Stream Losstolerant Authentication (TESLA) [68] (and its variants) and signature-based schemes like
Efficient Multichained Stream Signature (EMSS) [68], Augmented Chain (AC) graph-based
stream authentication [34], Signature Amortization using Information Dispersal Algorithm
(SAIDA) [66], and Wong and Lam (WL) [82]. While TESLA is efficient and robust against
data loss, it requires time synchronization between a signer and a verifier, sufficiently large
buffers for storing all unverified blocks (until the verification key is received), and storage
of long key chains which can lead to scalability issues. This makes TESLA less suitable for
authenticating stream, and vulnerable to DoS attacks that cause buffer overflow.
To reduce per-block overhead, signature-based stream authentication techniques either
rely on amortizing a single signature over multiple blocks or designing extremely fast
signature schemes, like k-time signatures [71] and Bins and Balls (BiBa) [67] to sign each
block. Designing extremely fast signature schemes often come at the cost of unreasonably
high storage and communication overheads [66, 82]. To amortize a signature over multiple
blocks in a stream, EMSS and AC use hash chains, SAIDA splits the signature and hash
value of each block over multiple blocks, and WL uses Merkle trees. EMSS, AC and SAIDA
are probabilistic authentication schemes, i.e., the ability of a receiver to verify a received
block depends on whether the receiver has some additional blocks of the stream in its
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possession (which inherently requires a verifier to maintain a buffer with multiple data
blocks). Thus, the probability that a receiver is able to verify a block depends on the nature
(bursty, independent, etc.) and probability of data loss during stream transmission. EMSS
and AC rely on redundant placement of multiple hashes in each block to deal with blocks
that are lost during transmission. SAIDA relies on erasure codes to recover from losses.
In probabilistic authentication schemes, maintaining a reasonable probability of verification
in the presence of high data loss leads to higher per-block communication overhead and
increased size of verifier-side data buffer. If per-block communication overhead is restricted,
verification probability drops with an increase in data loss.
The WL scheme is the only known deterministic stream authentication protocol. In
the WL scheme, a stream is divided into segments, with each segment containing multiple
blocks (in WL each block is a single packet). The computational overhead at the signer
and verifier, the signer’s buffer size and the per-block communication overhead are highly
dependent on the segment size. Computational overhead at the signer and verifier increases
with a decrease in the segment size. On the other hand, the buffer size at the signer and
the per-block communication overhead increase with an increase in the segment size. With
a reasonable block size (say, 16 [82]), the signer-side delay increases (affecting real-time
performance) along with the per-block communication overhead (to a magnitude of 100’s
of bytes).
Recently, Lysyanskaya et al. [55] proposed a stream authentication technique, Authenticated Error-Correcting Codes (AECC) using error correcting codes that is provably secure in
a formal adversarial network model that limits the capabilities of an adversary to injecting
and deleting packets in discrete quantities. The AECC scheme only requires one signature
operation for the entire stream and adds only a constant size authentication overhead per
packet. However, the AECC scheme requires the sender to possess the entire stream before
signing and thus, cannot be used for real-time generated content.
2.3

Trapdoor hash functions

Trapdoor hash functions are collision-resistant hash functions associated with a special
trapdoor key that enables the possessor of the key to find collisions between hashes of
different messages. A trapdoor hash function is associated to a (private, public) key pair,
also referred to as a (trapdoor, hash) key. Collisions are computationally infeasible to find
without the knowledge of the trapdoor key. However, given the trapdoor key along with
the trapdoor hash on a message, it is feasible to find a collision. A trapdoor hashing scheme
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consists of four algorithms for parameter generation, key pair generation, hash generation
and collision computation, respectively. Formally a trapdoor hashing scheme can be defined
as follows:
Definition 2.3.1. A trapdoor hashing scheme, TH, is a tuple hParGen, KeyGen, HashGen,
TrapColGeni whose components are defined as follows:
ParGen: A PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs system
public parameters params.
KeyGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params as input and outputs a (trapdoor, hash) key
pair (T K, HK).
HashGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, HK, a message m and a random element r
as inputs, and outputs the hash TH HK (m, r).
TrapColGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, a pair (T K, HK), a message m, a
random element r and an additional message m′ 6= m as inputs, and outputs a collision
parameter c such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , c).
The function TH is said to be associated with the (long-term) hash key HK. For
trapdoor hash function to be practical, computing the digest of a message using the HashGen
algorithm and collisions using the TrapColGen algorithm must be achievable in polynomial
time.
2.3.1

Security properties of trapdoor hash functions

Security notions associated with trapdoor hashing schemes include collision forgery
resistance and semantic security [74]. Collision forgery resistance implies that given system
parameters, params and hash key, HK, it is computationally infeasible to find a tuple
hm, m′ , r, ci such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , c).

Semantic security of a trapdoor

hashing scheme ensures that for all hash keys HK, and all pairs of messages m and m′ , where
m 6= m′ , the probability distributions of the hash values TH HK (m, r) and TH HK (m′ , r)
are computationally indistinguishable.
Another well-known property of trapdoor hash function is resistance to key exposure [4].
A trapdoor hashing scheme is said to suffer from the key exposure problem if given the system
parameters params and the tuple hm, m′ , r, r ′ , HKi such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ ),
the trapdoor key, T K corresponding to the hash key, HK can be computed in polynomial
time. The problem of key exposure was first discovered by Ateniese et al. [3]. Ateniese et al.
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observed that when a trapdoor hashing scheme is used for constructing non-interactive nontransferable signature scheme, called chameleon signatures, vulnerability of the trapdoor
hash function to key exposure undermines the property of non-transferability. In Chapter 3,
we present further details on the effects of key exposure in trapdoor hash functions on
applications of trapdoor hash functions in chameleon, online/offline and other signature
schemes.
2.3.2

A discrete log-based trapdoor hash function

Krawczyk et al. [44] proposed a simple DL-based trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-TH, which was
later used by Shamir et al. [74] in the construction of their online/offline signature scheme.
The ParGen, KeyGen, HashGen and TrapColGen algorithms of the DL-based hashing scheme
are executed as follows:
DL-TH.ParGen: Entities choose and agree upon common system public parameters params =
hp, q, α, Hi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively, q | p − 1, α
is an element of order q in Z∗p and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q is a cryptographic hash function.
DL-TH.KeyGen: An entity uses the system public parameters params, to generate its (private)
trapdoor key and (public) hash key pair, (T K, HK) = (y, Y ), where y ∈R Z∗q and
Y = αy ∈ Z∗p .
DL-TH.HashGen: An entity generates a trapdoor hash of a message m ∈ Z∗q using the hash key
Y , by choosing an element r ∈R Z∗q and computing the hash as TH Y (m, r) = αH(m) Y r
mod q. The function TH is said to be associated with the hash key Y . Note that
the trapdoor hash function on the hashed message m does not affect any security
properties [44].
DL-TH.TrapColGen: Given the trapdoor key and hash key pair (T K, HK), m, r ∈ Z∗q and
an additional message m′ (6= m) ∈ Z∗q , an entity computes a collision parameter c ∈ Z∗q
such that, TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , c), by solving c ≡ y −1 (H(m) − H(m′ )) + r
mod q. Since m′ 6= m and r is uniformly distributed in Z∗q , the computed value c 6= r
is unique and is also uniformly distributed in Z∗q [74].
The DL-TH trapdoor hashing scheme is collision resistant as defined by Shamir et al. [74].
We present a brief proof of resistance of DL-TH against collisions.
Theorem 2.3.1. The trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-TH is collision resistant.
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Proof: [74] Collision forgery resistance implies that given system parameters params and
hash key HK as inputs, a PPT collision forger F has negligible probability to successfully
output the tuple hm, r, m′ , r ′ i that satisfies m 6= m′ and T HHK (m, r) = T HHK (m′ , r ′ ).
To the contrary, assume that there exists a PPT collision forger F that outputs
′

′

hm, r, m′ , r ′ i that satisfies m 6= m′ and αH(m) Y r ≡ αH(m ) Y r mod q with a probability
which is not negligible. The discrete log y of the hash key Y with respect to the basis α
can be calculated in polynomial time from the output, as follows: From the equality in the
trapdoor hash values of m and m′ we know that H(m) + yr ≡ H(m′ ) + yr ′ mod q. Also,
given that m 6= m′ and H is a cryptographic hash function, we know that H(m) 6= H(m′ )
and (r ′ − r) is non-zero modulo q. Thus, the discrete log of Y with respect to the basis α
can be computed as y = (r ′ − r)−1 (H(m) − H(m′ )) mod q. This contradicts the discrete
log assumption.
The trapdoor hashing scheme described above suffers from the well known key exposure
problem [4]. Given two pairs (m, r) and (m′ , c) such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , c),
any third party can compute the trapdoor key T K as
T K = (H(m) − H(m′ ))(c − r)−1

mod q

(2.1)

In Chapter 3 we use the DL-TH scheme as a basis for construction of an efficient trapdoor
hashing scheme, called DL-MTH, that is collision-resistant, key-exposure-resistant and
semantically secure. We use the proposed DL-MTH scheme as a building block to construct
efficient authentication schemes for securing various distributed applications.
2.3.3

Applications of trapdoor hash functions

The concept of a trapdoor hash function was originally derived from the notion of trapdoor
commitments proposed by Brassard et al. [15]; Krawczyk et al. [44] used trapdoor hash
functions (referred to as chameleon hash) to construct a non-interactive non-transferable
signature scheme, called chameleon signatures (closely related to undeniable signatures),
under the hash-and-sign paradigm. Chameleon signature allows a signer to undeniably
commit to the contents of a signed document, but does not allow the recipient of the
signature to disclose the signer’s commitment to a third party without the signer’s consent.
The problem of key-exposure in trapdoor hash functions was first identified by Ateniese
et al. [3] who presented a partial solution to the problem by constructing an identitybased trapdoor hash function that uses a different public key to compute the digest of
each message.

Chen et al. [26] proposed the first construction of a key-exposure free

trapdoor hash function in Gap Diffie-Hellman Group with bilinear pairings and described
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an application of chameleon signatures in receipt-free electronic voting schemes. Later,
Ateniese et al. [4] proposed several constructions of trapdoor hash functions without key
exposure, and provided several applications of trapdoor hashing like private auctions and
secure software distribution.

Shamir et al. [74] employed trapdoor hash functions to

develop a new paradigm, called hash-sign-switch, that can be used to convert any signature
scheme into an online/offline signature scheme [29]. In online/offline signature schemes, the
signature generation procedure is split into two phases that are performed offline (before
the message to be signed is known) and online (after the message is known). By shifting the
computational burden to the offline phase, online/offline signatures can achieve very high
efficiency for signing messages during the online phase.
Mehta et al. [59] introduced the idea of using trapdoor hash functions to build onetime proxy signatures (one proxy signature per delegation) by exploiting the key-exposure
property of trapdoor hash functions. In their scheme, the verifier need not be aware of the
existence of a proxy. The delegation process is considered confidential and verification of
a proxy signature requires only the delegator’s public key, and follows standard signature
verification procedures. Mehta et al. use techniques inherited from chameleon signatures
to resolve disputes between verifier and delegator, and between proxy and delegator.
2.4

Summary

In this chapter, we presented a brief introduction to common cryptographic concepts
and terminologies that will aid the reader in understanding the topics covered by this
dissertation.

We provided a technical description of digital signatures and trapdoor

hash functions along with their security properties and a brief review of a well-known
discrete log-based signature scheme, DL-Schnorr [72] and trapdoor hashing scheme, DLTH [44]. We also discussed related research work on proxy signatures [57] that are used
for authenticating agents acting on behalf of users, signature amortization schemes that
are used for authenticating individual blocks comprising a data stream and applications of
trapdoor hash functions in the construction of chameleon [44], online/offline [29] and proxy
signatures.
In the next chapter we present a novel and efficient discrete log-based trapdoor hash
function that will be used as a building block to construct various authentication schemes
including a proxy signature-based agent authentication scheme, and signature amortizationbased stream authentication scheme.
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Chapter 3

Building an efficient key-exposure-resistant trapdoor hash function

3.1

Introduction

Trapdoor hash functions were originally designed to construct non-interactive non-transferable
signature schemes, called chameleon signatures [44]. The idea is to use a trapdoor hash
function to compute the digest h of a message m and sign h using an arbitrary signing
algorithm. If the hash key associated to the trapdoor hash function belongs to the recipient,
then the signature is verifiable by no one other than the intended recipient. The recipient
can obtain a signature on a second message m′ by using its trapdoor key to compute a
hash collision between the original signed message m and m′ . In this case, the signer can
prove that the signature on m′ is a forgery by revealing the original signed message m with
the same hash value as m′ . Since it is infeasible for the signer to compute trapdoor hash
collisions, revealing m is seen as a proof of forgery by the recipient and revokes the original
and forged signatures, thus providing non-repudiation.
The original chameleon signature scheme by Krawczyk et al. [44] uses a trapdoor hash
function that is vulnerable to key exposure. Ateniese et al. [3] observed that a signature
forgery by the recipient (i.e., revealing a message m′ with the same hash value as the
original signed message m) results in the signer recovering the trapdoor key of the recipient.
Following the recovery of trapdoor key, the signer can invalidate other signatures which were
designated to be verified by the corresponding hash key, thus denying other signatures given
to the recipient. Due to the potential damage to the recipient resulting from a signature
forgery, a third party is likely to believe the authenticity of a recipient’s claim. Thus, the
threat of key exposure creates a strong disincentive for the recipient to forge signatures,
undermining the property of non-transferability provided by the scheme. To fix this issue
Ateniese et al. [3] proposed an identity-based trapdoor hashing scheme where the signer uses
a different hash key to sign each message. A hash collision produced by the recipient only
results in the exposure of trapdoor key associated to the single hash key used for signing a
single message, thus preventing the signer from denying signatures on other messages. The
aforementioned solution to the key exposure problem is partial, as the scheme still allows the
exposure of a single-use trapdoor key. Chen et al. [26] proposed the first key-exposure free
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trapdoor hash function in Gap Diffie-Hellman Group with bilinear pairings that prevents
exposure of the trapdoor key even if a message pair resulting in a hash collision is revealed.
Later, Ateniese et al. [4] presented non-pairing based key-exposure-free trapdoor hashing
schemes. Both Chen et al.’s and Ateniese et al.’s schemes [4, 26] prevent key exposure by
using an ephemeral component, which we call a transaction identifier, during computation
of a message digest that is unique for every message that is hashed. More specifically, in
the schemes by Chen et al. and Ateniese et al., the trapdoor hash function T H takes a
hash key HK, message m, a random value r and a transaction identifier i as inputs and
outputs the digest value h = TH HK (m, r, i). Collisions can only be computed under the
same transaction identifier i, i.e., given the tuple hm, r, ii, an entity with the trapdoor key
T K can generate hm′ , r ′ i such that TH HK (m, r, i) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ , i).
3.1.1

Problem statement

The constructions of key-exposure-free trapdoor hash functions by Chen et al. [26] and
Ateniese et al. [3, 4] are tailored towards addressing the property of non-transferability
and message hiding in chameleon signatures. The message hiding property of chameleon
signatures ensures that during settlement of disputes between a signer and a recipient to
ascertain whether or not a purported message was indeed the original one committed by the
signer, if the contested signature is invalid, the signer must be able to produce a message
that is different from the original signed message (thus, hiding the original message) and
authenticated by the same signature as the one on the purported message. To provide
message hiding and non-transferability, majority of the trapdoor hashing schemes by Chen
at al. [26] and Ateniese et al. [3, 4] (except one scheme proposed in [4]) require that given two
messages that result in a collision of their respective trapdoor hash values under the same
transaction identifier, an entity must be able to compute a trapdoor hash collision with a
third message under the given transaction identifier, without revealing the secret trapdoor
key. More specifically, if the recipient computes a hash collision between the original signed
message m and a new message m′ such that h = TH HK (m, r, i) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ , i), where
i is the transaction identifier and (r, r ′ ) are random values, then the signer can compute
a pair hm′′ , r ′′ i such that TH HK (m′′ , r ′′ , i) = h. This property, although beneficial for
chameleon signatures, represents a security flaw when trapdoor hash functions are used to
construct signature schemes where, rather than authenticating messages using conventional
digital signatures, we use the process of computing hash collisions using a trapdoor key to
authenticate messages.
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The general idea behind using collision computation for message authentication is as
follows: Let A be an entity in possession of a (private, public) key pair, (SK, P K) and a
(trapdoor, hash) key pair, (T K, HK). Assume that A generates a signature σ using SK on
the trapdoor hash of a message TH HK (m, r) and publishes hσ, m, ri in a publicly available
directory. Any entity that wishes to communicate with A first retrieves hσ, m, ri and verifies
the validity of σ on TH HK (m, r) using HK and P K. Now, when A needs to generate a new
signature on a new message m′ , it computes r ′ such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ ) using
its trapdoor key T K. The value r ′ represents a signature on m′ that can be verified by simply
checking whether TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ ). In this scheme, the ability of a third party
to compute a message m′′ , r ′′ such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ ) = TH HK (m′′ , r ′′ )
results in a forged signature σ on m′′ . Moreover, we note that using collision computation for
message authentication provides performance advantages over the conventional technique
of authenticating messages using digital signatures when the cost of computing collisions is
cheaper than signature generation and when cost of hash computation is cheaper than
signature verification.

We observe that the two schemes by Harn et al. [37] and the

scheme by Ateniese et al. [4] that do provide the property of preventing additional collisions
are computationally more expensive for collision and hash computation than the cost of
conventional signature generation and verification, respectively.

These inefficiencies of

existing trapdoor hashing schemes by Harn et al. and Ateniese et al. undermine our
incentive to use the process of computing collisions, instead of conventional signatures,
for message authentication.

Thus, building authentication schemes that use collision

computation for message authentication require a trapdoor hashing scheme that is efficient,
key-exposure-free, collision-resistant and never allows a third party to compute hash
collisions given two messages that hash to the same value.
3.1.2

Contributions

In this chapter, we introduce an efficient, discrete log-based trapdoor hashing scheme
that is resistant to collisions and key-exposure. The proposed trapdoor hashing scheme
is designed for use as a building block to construct signature schemes that employ the
process of computing hash collisions using a trapdoor key to authenticate messages. The
proposed scheme achieves key-exposure-freeness by splitting the (trapdoor, hash) key pair
into two components, one permanent and the other ephemeral, and using the ephemeral
keys to compute trapdoor hash collisions between digest values of two distinct messages.
Unlike prior schemes by Chen et al. [26] and Ateniese et al. [4], the proposed scheme
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ensures that it is computationally infeasible for a third party to compute an additional
collision with the knowledge of a message pair whose trapdoor hash values are equal. We
provide formal definitions of trapdoor hash functions, collision forgery resistance and key
exposure resistance for schemes that use ephemeral keys for collision computation. We also
present a detailed security analysis of the proposed discrete log-based trapdoor hashing
scheme and prove its resistance to collision forgery and key exposure under the discrete log
assumption. We present a performance comparison of the proposed scheme against existing
key-exposure-free trapdoor hashing schemes. Our performance comparison demonstrates
that the proposed scheme achieves superior performance compared to existing key-exposurefree trapdoor hashing schemes.
Chapter Organization: The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2
we present formal definitions of trapdoor hash functions and their security properties, that
are tailored towards schemes with multiple trapdoors. In Section 3.3 we present a novel
discrete log-based trapdoor hashing scheme that is collision-resistant, key-exposure-free and
prevents a third party from computing additional collisions given a message pair that have
the same trapdoor hash values. We present a detailed analysis of the proposed scheme in
Section 3.4 including its correctness, security and performance. Section 3.5 summarizes the
chapter.
3.2

Definitions

In this section we present a definition of trapdoor hashing scheme that extends traditional
definitions [74] by allowing constructions of trapdoor hash functions that can generate
collisions using ephemeral keys. We also re-define notions of collision forgery resistance and
key exposure resistance pertaining to trapdoor hash functions with ephemeral components.
A trapdoor hashing scheme with multiple trapdoors can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. A trapdoor hashing scheme, TH, is a tuple hParGen, KeyGen, HashGen,
TrapColGeni whose components are defined as follows:
ParGen: A probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm that takes a security parameter
λ as input and outputs system public parameters params.
KeyGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params as input and outputs a (trapdoor, hash) key
pair (T K, HK).
HashGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, HK, a message m and a random element r
as inputs, and outputs the hash TH HK (m, r).
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TrapColGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, a pair (T K, HK), a message m, a
random element r and an additional message m′ 6= m as inputs, and outputs a
collision parameter c and HK ′ such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , c).
HK ′

6= HK, the public key

HK ′

When

along with the corresponding private key T K ′ is

called an ephemeral key pair.
The function TH is said to be associated with the (long-term) hash key HK. In the
past, researchers have suggested trapdoor hash functions with ephemeral components [3, 4].
However, traditional definitions for collision resistance of trapdoor hashing schemes [74] do
not address trapdoor hash functions with multiple trapdoors. Moreover, prior definitions of
key exposure resistance [3, 4] are tailored towards specific properties required for ensuring
non-transferability of chameleon signatures.

In this section, we provide more general

definitions of collision resistance and key exposure resistance of a trapdoor hash function
with ephemeral components.
Definition 3.2.2. Let TH be a trapdoor hash function associated with hash key HK with
corresponding trapdoor key T K. Given system parameters params, and hash keys HK and
HK ′ , a collision forgery is defined as finding a tuple hm, r, m′ , ci such that:
[m 6= m′ ] ∧ [TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , c)].

(3.1)

When HK = HK ′ , the collision is called a simple collision, and when HK 6= HK ′ , the
collision is called an ephemeral collision.
Let F be a PPT algorithm that takes hash keys HK and HK ′ , and system parameters
params as inputs, and outputs the tuple hm, r, m′ , ci that satisfy the conditions in (3.1).
Let Col(hm, r, m′ , ci, HK, HK ′ ) be a predicate denoting that (3.1) holds. We define the
advantage of the PPT collision forger F as:
g
AdvCF
(λ) = P r[Col(F(params, HK, HK ′ ), HK, HK ′ )]
F

The probability is over random choices of HK, HK ′ , the size of the security parameter λ
and the input of randomness for the algorithm F.
Collision Forgery Resistance: A trapdoor hashing scheme TH =hParGen, KeyGen,
HashGen, TrapColGeni is collision-forgery-resistant if, for all PPT algorithms F of
polynomial time complexity in the security parameter λ that output hm, r, m′ , ci satisfying
g
[Col(F(params, HK, HK ′ ), HK, HK ′ )] ∧ [HK = HK ′ ], AdvCF
(λ) is negligible.
F

Ephemeral Collision Forgery Resistance: A trapdoor hashing scheme TH =hParGen,
KeyGen, HashGen, TrapColGeni is ephemeral-collision-forgery-resistant if, for all PPT
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algorithms F of polynomial time complexity in the security parameter λ, that output
g
hm, r, m′ , ci satisfying [Col(F(params, HK, HK ′ ), HK, HK ′ )] ∧ [HK 6= HK ′ ], AdvCF
F (λ)

is negligible.
Another security property of trapdoor hashing scheme, captured by the notion of
semantic security, is that a trapdoor hash value h = TH HK (m, r) must not reveal any
information about the possible message m that was hashed. Let X be a random variable
that takes on a finite set of values x1 , x2 , . . . , xn , with probability P (X = xi ) = pi , where
P
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ni=1 pi = 1. The entropy of X, denoted by H [X], is
the measure of information provided by an observation of X, or equivalently, the measure of
uncertainty about the outcome of an experiment before an observation of X. The entropy
P
of X is defined to be H [X] = ni=1 pi lg( p1i ). Let H [X|Y = y] denote the entropy of the
variable X given the value of a random variable Y . Since, HashGen is a PPT algorithm, the
value TH HK (·, ·) is a random variable distributed over all strings in the range of TH HK (·, ·),
where the probability space is the set of all possible outcomes resulting from the random
moves of HashGen. Let M denote the message space. Let m denote a random variable that
takes on the finite set of values in the domain of T H from the message space M. Semantic
security of a trapdoor hashing scheme is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.3 ([4]). A trapdoor hashing scheme is said to be semantically security if,
for all hash keys HK, the conditional entropy H [m|h] of the message m given its trapdoor
hash value h = TH HK (m, r) equals the total entropy H [m] of the message space M.
A well-known property of trapdoor hash function is with regards to key exposure
resistance [4]. Informally, a trapdoor hashing scheme is said to suffer from the key exposure
problem if given the system parameters params and the tuple hm, r, m′ , r ′ , HK, HK ′ i such
that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , r ′ ), the trapdoor key T K corresponding to the hash key
HK can be computed in polynomial time. A trapdoor hashing scheme is said to be resistant
to key exposure or key-exposure-free if, given the same inputs as before, it is computationally
infeasible to compute T K. Formally, the key exposure problem and key exposure resistance
can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.4. Let TH be a trapdoor hash function associated with hash key HK with
corresponding trapdoor key T K. Given the system parameters params, hash key HK, and
the tuple hm, r, m′ , r ′ , HK ′ i such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , r ′ ), key exposure is the
problem of finding the trapdoor key T K corresponding to HK.
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Let K be a PPT algorithm that takes system parameters params, a hash key HK, and a
tuple hm, r, m′ , r ′ , HK ′ i such that TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , r ′ ) as input and outputs the
trapdoor key T K corresponding to hash key HK. Let Col(T K, HK) be a predicate denoting
that the trapdoor key T K corresponds to the hash key HK. We define the advantage of the
PPT collision forger K as:
AdvKExp
(λ) = P r[Col(K(params, HK, m, r, m′ , r ′ , HK ′ ), HK)]
K
The probability is over random choices of HK, the size of the security parameter λ and the
input of randomness for the algorithm K.
Key Exposure Resistance: A trapdoor hashing scheme TH = hParGen, KeyGen,
HashGen, TrapColGeni is key-exposure-resistant if, for all PPT algorithms K of time complexity polynomial in the security parameter λ, that output T K satisfying [Col(K(params,
HK, m, r, m′ , r ′ , HK ′ ), HK)], AdvKExp
(λ) is negligible.
K
3.3

Proposed key-exposure-free trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-MTH

The trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-TH, described in Section 2.3.2 suffers from the keyexposure problem. In this section, we use DL-TH as a basis for construction of an efficient,
collision-resistant, key-exposure-resistant trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-MTH.
Intuitively, the trapdoor hashing scheme DL-TH suffers from key exposure because
extracting the trapdoor key given a collision involves solving a simple equation with one
unknown [cf. Eqn. 2.1, Section 2.3.2]. To prevent this, we utilize multiple trapdoors in our
collision computation. The use of multiple trapdoors for collision computation has the effect
of converting the equation for extracting the trapdoor key (given a collision) from having
one unknown, into an equation with two unknowns, which in turn, makes it computationally
infeasible to compute the trapdoor key given a collision producing message pair.
The ParGen, KeyGen, HashGen and TrapColGen algorithms of the proposed DL-based
trapdoor hashing scheme, called DL-MTH are executed as follows:
DL-MTH.ParGen: Entities choose and agree upon common system public parameters params =
hp, q, α, Hi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively, q | p − 1, α
is an element of order q in Z∗p and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q is a cryptographic hash function.
DL-MTH.KeyGen: An entity uses the system public parameters params, to generate its
(private) trapdoor key and (public) hash key pair, (T K, HK) = (y, Y ), where y ∈R Z∗q
and Y = αy ∈ Z∗p .
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DL-MTH.HashGen: An entity generates a trapdoor hash of a message m ∈ Z∗q using the hash
key Y , by choosing an element r ∈ Z∗q and computing the hash as TH Y (m, r) =
αH(m||Y ) Y r mod q. The function, T H is said to be associated with hash key Y .
DL-MTH.TrapColGen: Given the trapdoor key and hash key pair (T K, HK), m, r ∈ Z∗q and
an additional message m′ (6= m) ∈ Z∗q , an entity finds a trapdoor collision parameter
c ∈ Z∗q as follows:
1. Choose an ephemeral trapdoor key z ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral hash key Z = αz ∈ Z∗p .
2. Using trapdoor keys y and z, solve for c such that TH Y (m, r) = TH Z (m′ , c).
Compute c as c = z −1 (H(m||Y ) − H(m′ ||Z) + yr) mod q.
In the schemes by Chen et al. [26] and Ateniese et al. [3, 4], an entity computes a
trapdoor hash value using an ephemeral component, called a transaction identifier, i, as
h = TH HK (m, r, i). Collisions can be computed using the long-term trapdoor key under
the same transaction identifier, i.e., given the tuple hm, r, ii, an entity with the trapdoor
key T K can generate hm′ , r ′ i such that TH HK (m, r, i) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ , i). Due to the
message hiding property of the key-exposure-resistant trapdoor hashing schemes by Chen
et al. and Ateniese et al., revealing a collision hm, r, , m′ , r ′ , ii allows any third party to
compute hm′′ , r ′′ i such that TH HK (m, r, i) = TH HK (m′ , r ′ , i) = TH HK (m′′ , r ′′ , i) without
compromising the long-term trapdoor key. Thus, the schemes by Chen et al. [26] and
Ateniese et al. [3, 4] can never be used in schemes where a signer authenticates a new
message by finding collisions between the hash of the original signed-message and the new
message that needs to be signed.
Unlike the schemes by Chen et al. [26] and Ateniese et al. [3, 4], the DL-MTH scheme
allows collisions of the form TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , r ′ ), where revealing the tuple
hm, r, , m′ , r ′ , HK ′ i, does not allow a third party to forge additional collisions or reveal
the trapdoor key [cf. Section 3.4.2]. Thus, the form of collisions produced by the proposed
scheme can be used in authentication schemes that use collision computation using the
trapdoor key to authenticate new messages.
Notice that in the proposed scheme, an entity is required to use multiple keys (long-term
and ephemeral) during collision computation. Without this requirement, i.e., if we compute
a collision using only the long-term key as c = y −1 (H(m||Y ) − H(m′ ||Y ) + yr) mod q, the
resulting tuple hm, r, m′ , ci, with TH Y (m, r) = TH Y (m′ , c) can be used to compute the
long-term trapdoor key. The requirement of using ephemeral keys for collision computation
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in the proposed DL-MTH scheme is similar to the requirement of using ephemeral keys to
compute signatures using the ElGamal family of signature schemes [38].
3.4

Analysis of the DL-MTH trapdoor hashing scheme

We present a theoretical analysis of the proposed DL-based trapdoor hashing scheme, DLMTH, including correctness, security and performance.
3.4.1

Correctness

In this section, we demonstrate that given system parameters params, the trapdoor key and
hash key pair (T K, HK), the pair m, r ∈ Z∗q and an additional message m′ (6= m) ∈ Z∗q ,
the collision parameter c that is computed according to the DL-MTH.TrapColGen procedure
described in Section 3.3 results in generating a collision between the trapdoor hash values
of m and m′ .
During computation of c, we know that Z = αz ∈ Z∗p and c = z −1 (H(m||Y )−H(m′ ||Z)+
yr) mod q. Thus,
′

TH Z (m′ , c) = αH(m ||Z)Z c
′

= αH(m ||Z)Z z

−1 (H(m||Y

′

)−H(m′ ||Z)+yr)
′

= αH(m ||Z)α(H(m||Y )−H(m ||Z)+yr)
= α(H(m||Y )+yr)
= α(H(m||Y ) Y r = TH Y (m, r)
Thus, the technique to compute trapdoor hash collisions in the proposed DL-MTH is
correct.
3.4.2

Security

In this section we provide a detailed security analysis of the proposed DL-based trapdoor
hashing scheme DL-MTH. We prove the following theorems to show that the difficulty of
forging collisions and key exposure in the DL-MTH scheme is based on the difficulty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem in subgroup of Z∗p .
Theorem 3.4.1. The proposed trapdoor hashing scheme DL-MTH is collision forgery resistant
and ephemeral collision forgery resistant.
Proof:

We prove the forgery resistance property of the proposed trapdoor hashing

scheme by showing that the discrete log problem in subgroup of Z∗p reduces to collision
forgery, thus violating the well known discrete log assumption.
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Based on Defn. 3.2.2, we need to consider two cases: (1) When HK = HK ′ (for collision
forgery resistance); (2) When HK 6= HK ′ (for ephemeral collision forgery resistance). The
proof for the first case is well-known and the reader is referred to the proof of Theorem 2.3.1
for details.
For the case when HK 6= HK ′ , assume that there exists a PPT collision forger F as
defined in Defn. 3.2.2 against the proposed trapdoor hashing scheme with non-negligible
advantage.

Given the hash keys HK, HK ′ (6= HK) and parameters hp, q, αi, F runs

in polynomial time and outputs the tuple hm, r, m′ , ci such that m 6= m′ , r 6= c and
TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , c) with non-negligible probability. Given F we can construct
a PPT algorithm G that breaks the discrete log problem as follows. G is given a DLP
instance hp, q, α, Xi. G needs to find x ∈ Z∗q such that X = αx mod p. G chooses y ∈R Z∗q ,
computes Y = αy mod p. G independently runs (in parallel) two instances of forger F,
where each instance of F executes with independent randomness on hp, q, α, X, Y i as inputs,
until each instance of F produces the collision forgeries hm1 , r1 , m′1 , c1 i and hm2 , r2 , m′2 , c2 i,
respectively. If m1 = m2 or r1 = r2 or m′1 = m′2 or c1 = c2 repeat execution of F. Given
that TH HK (m1 , r1 ) = TH HK ′ (m′1 , c1 ) and TH HK (m2 , r2 ) = TH HK ′ (m′2 , c2 ), we obtain
the following two linear equations:
H(m1 ||X) + xr1 = H(m′1 ||Y ) + yc1

mod q

H(m2 ||X) + xr2 = H(m′2 ||Y ) + yc2

mod q

It is straightforward to argue that the two equations are linearly independent, and thus,
can be solved for x and y. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.4.2. The proposed trapdoor hashing scheme, DL-MTH is key-exposure-resistant.
Proof:

Observing the modified collision computation in DL-MTH, key exposure

resistance implies that given two tuples hm, r, HKi and hm′ , r ′ , HK ′ i, such that m 6= m′ ,
r 6= r ′ , HK 6= HK ′ and TH HK (m, r) = TH HK ′ (m′ , r ′ ), the probability that a PPT
algorithm outputs T K is negligible.
To the contrary, assume that there exists a PPT algorithm that outputs T K in
polynomial time with non-negligible probability. The discrete log of hash key HK ′ can
be computed as:
T K ′ ≡ (r ′ )−1 (H(m||HK) + T K ∗ r − H(m′ ||HK ′ ))

mod q

This contradicts the well known discrete log assumption. Thus, the proposed trapdoor
hashing scheme is resistant to key exposure.
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In addition to collision forgery resistance and key exposure-freeness, the proposed
trapdoor hashing scheme also provides semantic security. A trapdoor hashing scheme is
said to be semantically secure if, for all hash keys HK, and all pairs of messages m and m′ ,
m 6= m′ , the probability distributions of the hash values TH HK (m, r) and TH HK (m′ , r)
are computationally indistinguishable. We omit the proof here as it closely follows the
technique by Ateniese et al. [4].
3.4.3

Performance

Table 3.1 shows a performance comparison of the proposed scheme, DL-MTH with the schemes
of Harn et al. (MCDLTH and MCRSATH) [37] and a scheme by Ateniese et al. (NRTH) [4] that
provide features similar to the proposed scheme. In Table 3.1, the term x denotes the cost
of modular exponentiation with 160-bit exponent and 1024-bit modulus, and e denotes the
cost of modular exponentiation with 1024-bit exponent and 1024-bit modulus,.
Table 3.1: Performance comparison of proposed trapdoor hashing scheme DL-MTH with
existing schemes.
Hash computation
Collision computation
Public key size (bits)
Hash size (bits)
Underlying Problem

MCDLTH [37]
3x
1x
1024
160
DL

MCRSATH [37]
1e
1e
1024
1024
RSA

NRTH [4]
2x
1x
1024
160
DL

DL-MTH
2x
1x
1024
160
DL

From the table we can see that the proposed scheme DL-MTH and the NRTH schemes are
more efficient than the other schemes for hash computation. The MCDLTH scheme requires
an additional exponentiation compared to the proposed scheme. The RSA-based MCRSATH
scheme requires exponentiations with 1024-bit exponent which tend to be approximately 6
times slower compared to exponentiations with 160-bit exponents required by the DL-based
schemes. Moreover, the MCRSATH is the least efficient in terms of collision computation cost,
public key size and hash size compared to all three DL-based schemes. The DL-MTH, NRTH
and MCDLTH are equally efficient during collision computation, require public keys of the
same size and produce the same length hash value.
Overall, the DL-MTH and the NRTH offer similar performance across all parameters, with
the MCDLTH scheme being less efficient for computing the hash value, and the MCRSATH
being less efficient in all respects. However, the exponentiation operation during collision
computation in the NRTH scheme must be performed online. On the other hand, the proposed
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scheme allows the exponentiation during collision computation to be performed offline, in
which case, the online phase of collision computation in the proposed scheme is considerably
faster compared to the NRTH scheme. Thus, the DL-MTH offers the best overall performance
compared with existing schemes of [37] and [4].
3.5

Summary

Trapdoor hash functions were originally designed for constructing non-interactive and nontransferable signature schemes, called chameleon signatures [44]. Chameleon signatures are
verifiable by no one other than the intended recipient. To provide non-repudiation and
message hiding in chameleon signatures, majority of existing trapdoor hashing schemes [3,
4, 26, 44, 74] allow an entity to compute a trapdoor hash collision with a third message given
two messages that result in a collision of their respective trapdoor hash values. Moreover,
the handful (to be specific, only three) of existing trapdoor hash functions [4, 37] that
provide the property of preventing additional collisions are computationally more expensive
than conventional signatures. Thus, existing trapdoor hash functions are not suitable for use
in signature schemes that use the process of computing hash collisions using a trapdoor key,
rather than generating conventional signatures using a secret key, to authenticate messages.
In this chapter, we presented a key-exposure and collision-resistant, discrete log-based
trapdoor hash function that is efficient to compute and ensures that it is computationally
infeasible for a third party to compute additional hash collisions with the knowledge of
a message pair whose trapdoor hash values are equal. We provided formal definitions of
trapdoor hash functions and their security for schemes that use ephemeral keys for collision
computation. We also presented a theoretical analysis, including correctness, security and
performance, of the proposed trapdoor hashing scheme. In our security analysis we proved
the resistance to collision forgery and key exposure under the discrete log assumption. Our
performance comparison of the proposed scheme against existing key-exposure-free trapdoor
hashing schemes demonstrates that the proposed scheme achieves superior performance in
terms of computation overhead during trapdoor hash and collision computation compared
to existing schemes.
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Chapter 4

Efficient proxy signatures based on trapdoor hash functions

4.1

Introduction

Today, many large-scale and complex distributed systems like peer-to-peer networks,
pervasive and ubiquitous computing environments, Cloud systems, and Grids are highly
dynamic, decentralized and loosely coupled with constituent components that are spread
throughout a network. Researchers have advocated agent-based computing as the natural
computational model for such systems [40].

For instance, agent-based computing has

been used in Grids, by employing agents (also called proxies) to eliminate the need to
have the user online during long-lived computations, scheduling access to resources and
map computations onto resources [17, 31].

Industry, government, and academia have

been developing applications for mobile agents for use in telecommunications systems,
personal digital assistants, information management, and e-commerce [62] where clients
need to search for special services or products, negotiate with potential business entities
and perform remote operations on behalf of some other clients. More recently, Weissman et
al. [81] proposed the use of agents in Cloud computing systems to accelerate applications
by performing optimized operations at strategic network locations in the Cloud with high
bandwidth to/from a Cloud service relative to the service user.
4.1.1

Addressing security in agent-based systems

Use of agent-based computing in multi-Cloud, Grid and other distributed systems opens
up new avenues for adversarial users to compromise the system. Security in Clouds and
other IT systems heavily rely on establishing trust relationships among the actors involved.
In agent-based computing, users have to establish trust relationships with agents which
includes their security, reliability, availability, and business continuity guarantees. Moreover,
sensitive information stored and processed by agents need to be protected from exposure,
alteration and corruption.
One technique of establishing trust relationships with agents is by strengthening the role
of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to include security guarantees on top of QoS. However,
in the context of securing Agent-based systems, SLAs are currently in their nascent form
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and require considerable advancements to mature. In the meantime, researchers need to
focus on developing mechanisms that would aid in providing these security guarantees.
These mechanisms include encryption, authentication, authorization and integrity checks.
Agents-based security solutions have been used in Grids [17, 31] to provide authentication and access control. Combination of user agents and resource agents in Grids have been
used for implementing security policies that can support single sign-on, interoperability
among different local policies, and authenticated and authorized access to resources in the
Grid [17, 31]. Agent-optimized multi-Cloud applications can also benefit from a Gridlike security architecture, where we can enhance the capabilities of agents to perform
authentication and authorization on behalf of a service user in addition to accelerating
Cloud applications. An effective technique for providing authentication (in addition to
authorization) in agent-based systems is by use of proxy signatures.
4.1.2

Application of proxy signatures in agent-based systems

Proxy delegation is a process by which an entity, the delegator, transfers its signing rights
and capabilities to another entity, the proxy. Following delegation, the proxy can generate
signatures on behalf of the delegator. The process of proxy delegation has been classified
into three broad categories, namely, full delegation, partial delegation and delegation-bywarrant or certificate. Full delegation is a rather intuitive solution in which the delegator
securely transfers its secret key to the proxy. This requires absolute trust on the proxy,
a secure channel and provides unrestricted signing rights to proxy. In a partial delegation
scheme, the delegator also uses a secure channel to transfer a delegation key derived from
its secret key to the proxy. The proxy then derives its proxy signing key pair from the
delegation key. However, the proxy still maintains unrestricted signing capabilities. As
opposed to full and partial delegation that require secure channel and absolute trust on the
proxy, delegation-by-warrant approach eliminates these impractical requirements [13]. A
warrant embodies a set of business and security policies agreed in advance by the delegator
and the proxy that restrict the signing capabilities of the proxy. The delegator generates
a warrant and a signature on the warrant, called a certificate, and sends the (warrant,
certificate) pair to the proxy. The proxy generates signatures — using its own private key
— on messages that must conform to the warrant, and includes the (warrant, certificate)
pair in the resulting signatures. Any entity wanting to verify a proxy signature must check
the validity of the proxy signature as well as delegator’s agreement on the signed message.
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In agent-based systems, users would play the role of delegators and delegate their signing
rights to agents (proxies) using warrants that limit signing capabilities of agents. Agents
could span multiple administrative domains with different local security policies in each
domain. In such scenarios, warrants can map security policies between different domains
and allow integrating local policies of multiple domains into the global security framework.
A proxy signature not only provides assurance that an agent is the authentic originator
of a message, but also that the agent is legitimately acting on behalf of a user within
constraints specified in the warrant. Moreover, proxy signatures simplify security auditing
and obtaining support for investigations by providing non-repudiation.
4.1.3

Problem statement

The importance of proxy signatures has been repeatedly highlighted by applied cryptographers: variations of proxy signatures include threshold proxy signatures [78], blind
proxy signatures [6], proxy signatures with warrant recovery [45] and so forth. However,
many recent developments in the area of proxy signatures rely on heuristic arguments
demonstrating security rather than providing provable security guarantees [13]. Moreover,
formal construction of provably secure proxy signatures by Boldyreva et al. [13], Malkin
et al. [56] and Schuldt et al. [73] have introduced unnecessary complexity in the design of
proxy signatures which lead to high computational and communication overhead.
4.1.4

Contributions

In this chapter, we make the following contributions towards securing multi-agent systems:
1. We propose an elegant technique to construct a provably secure proxy signature using
trapdoor hash functions [3, 4, 44, 74] that can be used to authenticate and authorize
agents acting on behalf of users in agent-based computing systems. The generic
technique allows the choice of primitives open to policy specifications. Moreover,
security of the proposed technique does not rely on availability of a secure channel.
2. The proposed generic technique only requires execution of a conventional signature
scheme during the offline delegation phase and not during the online proxy signature
generation phase; this improvement is due to the use of trapdoor hash functions [59,
74] as a building block. Thus, the proposed technique inherently provides the efficiency
of online/offline signature schemes [29].
3. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach for creating practical instances by
applying properties of discrete log-based cryptosystem to produce an efficient proxy
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signature scheme. We compare the performance of the discrete log-based scheme
with existing schemes. Our performance analysis shows a clear improvement in the
performance over prior schemes, which can be attributed to our proxy signature
construction technique.
Chapter Organization: The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We present
a generic technique to construct proxy signature schemes using trapdoor hash functions
and provide formal definitions and security specifications in Section 4.2 and provide a
detailed proof of security of the generic construction using the random oracle model [11]. In
Section 4.3, we use primitives from discrete log based cryptosystem to present an efficient
instantiation of the proposed technique. We perform a theoretical analysis of the DL-based
proxy signature scheme in Section 4.4. We summarize the Chapter in Section 4.5.
4.2

Technique to construct proxy signatures using trapdoor hash functions

In this section, we present the basic idea behind the construction of proxy signature schemes
using trapdoor hash functions followed by formal definitions, security specifications and
semantics of trapdoor hash-based proxy signature schemes. Finally we present the proposed
generic trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme.
4.2.1

Basic idea

We begin with providing the basic idea behind the construction of proxy signature schemes
using trapdoor hash functions. We also provide heuristic arguments in support of informal
security requirements like undeniability, identifiability and verifiability that were introduced
by Lee et al. [47]. A formal security treatment of the proposed scheme is provided later in
the chapter.
Fig. 4.1 shows the basic idea behind the construction of a trapdoor hash-based
proxy signature scheme. A proxy signature scheme is divided into four phases, namely,
initialization, proxy delegation, proxy signature generation and proxy signature verification.
During the initialization phase, all entities choose and agree upon common system public
parameters and generate their (public, private) key pairs. An entity (the delegator) wanting
to delegate signing rights to another entity (the proxy), does the following:
1. Creates an appropriate warrant. The delegator and the proxy agree upon warrant
specifications by out of band mechanisms, perhaps using and abiding by formal
business policies. The structure of the warrant plays an important role in restricting
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VERIFIER
DELEGATOR
(warrant, signature)

(warrant, message,
PROXY
proxy signature)

Generates trapdoor
hash of warrant
using hash key
of proxy
Signs hashed
warrant using its
secret key

Verifies delegator’s signature
on warrant

Checks whether message
conforms to warrant

Does not generate signature
in traditional sense

Computes trapdoor hash of
warrant and message using
proxy’s hash key

Uses its trapdoor key to find
collision between hash of
warrant and message
proxy signature = (collision
result) + (signature on
warrant)

Verifies signature on hashed
warrant using delegator’s
public key
Checks that trapdoor hash
values of warrant and
message match

Figure 4.1: Basic technique of using a trapdoor hash function to generate proxy signatures.

the proxy’s signing rights by dictating the types of messages that the proxy can sign,
the validity period and other restrictions [13, 73].
2. Computes a trapdoor hash of the warrant. The associated hash key belongs to the
proxy being designated.
3. Generates a signature on the trapdoor hash of warrant.

In the instantiation of

the proposed generic proxy signature scheme, we use the provably secure Schnorr
variant [72].

However, the choice of the signing equation is open to policy

specifications. The delegator’s signature on the warrant prevents misuse of signing
rights by illegitimate modifications of the warrant by a malicious delegator, proxy, or
any other adversary.
4. Sends the (warrant, signature) pair to the proxy over an insecure channel. We assume
the channel is reliable and do not consider network reliability issues.
After receiving the (warrant, signature) pair, the proxy checks the warrant specifications.
If the warrant is bogus, the proxy aborts; otherwise, it verifies the delegator’s signature on
the warrant. This completes the proxy delegation phase.
Note, unlike most common proxy signature schemes [13, 47, 43], the proxy signing key
pair is not derived from the delegator’s signature, in the proxy delegation phase. In our
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scheme, the proxy does not generate a signature on a message, in the traditional sense, on
behalf of the delegator. Instead, the proxy uses its trapdoor key, known exclusively to itself,
to find a trapdoor collision between the trapdoor hash of the warrant and the given message.
This guarantees undeniability. The proxy then tags the result of the collision along with
the delegator’s signature, warrant and message to collectively generate the proxy signature.
Any entity that wants to verify the proxy signature does the following:
1. Checks whether the message conforms to the warrant.
2. Obtains the hash key of the proxy from a publicly available directory and computes
the trapdoor hash of the warrant. This provides strong identifiability.
3. Checks the delegation agreement by verifying the delegator’s signature on the hashed
warrant. If verification fails, the verifier aborts. This guarantees verifiability.
4. Computes the trapdoor hash of the message using the result of the collision contained
in the proxy signature.
5. Verifies that the proxy indeed stamped the message with the secret trapdoor key, by
comparing the trapdoor hash of the message and the warrant. If the hash values do
not match, the verifier aborts.
Verification of subsequent proxy signatures, exchanged by the same (proxy, verifier) pair
gets more efficient: the verifier computes the trapdoor hash of the message and compares
it with the previously computed trapdoor hash of warrant. Intuitively, this improvement
in efficiency happens because the delegator’s signature on the warrant contained within the
proxy signature does not change from one message to another.
4.2.2

Definitions, security specifications and semantics

We now formally define a trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme. We assume existence
of a public key infrastructure, where each entity is associated with a certificate signed by
a certificate authority (CA). This public key certificate binds the entity’s identity with its
public key. The CA is responsible for ensuring that no two identities are bound to the
same public key (i.e., public keys are unique). The CA is also responsible for differentiating
keys used for signing and trapdoor hashing and including the purpose of key usage in the
certificate. To further simplify our constructions, we assume that identities are unique
to each entity and cannot be spoofed (for eg., by generating identities as hash of public
keys). Thus, users can be uniquely identified by their public keys, and vice versa, using
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certificates, and without relying on proofs of knowledge [73]. Moreover, we also assume a
publicly available directory, from which entities can retrieve public key certificates of other
entities, given their identities. We explicitly include warrants and its structure as part of
our definition and security model to avoid trivial attacks involving malicious alteration of
warrants [13].
Definition 4.2.1. A trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme TPS is the tuple hParGen,
KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer, (Delegate, Accept), PSigGen, PSigVeri whose components are
defined as follows:
ParGen: A PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs system
public parameters params.
KeyGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params as input and outputs a (private, public) key
pair (SK, P K) and a (trapdoor, hash) key pair (T K, HK).
SigGen: A PPT algorithm that takes params, a message m and SK as inputs and outputs
a signature σ on m.
SigVer: A deterministic algorithm that takes params, P K, m and σ as inputs and outputs
Valid if σ was generated on m using SK and Invalid otherwise.
Delegate, Accept: A pair of interactive algorithms for proxy delegation that are defined as
follows:
Delegate: A PPT algorithm that takes params, SK and HK as inputs and computes
a delegation certificate cert containing the following: (1) A warrant w that
contains a message space descriptor as defined in [13] and identities of delegator
and proxy; (2) A random element r; (3) A signature σ generated using SK on
TH HK (w, r). Delegate has no local output. Delegate will interact with Accept
for delegation of signing rights.
Accept: A deterministic algorithm that takes params, cert, P K and HK as input,
and outputs hAccept, certi if: (1) w conforms to agreement between delegator
and proxy, and (2) σ was generated on TH HK (w, r) using SK; and hReject, ⊥i
otherwise.
PSigGen: A PPT proxy signature generation algorithm that takes params, cert, a message
m and T K as inputs and outputs a proxy signature σP on m conforming to warrant
w.
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PSigVer: A deterministic algorithm that takes params, P K, HK, m and σP as inputs and
outputs Valid if: (1) m conforms to w, and (2) σP was generated on m using T K;
and Invalid otherwise.

Modeling the Adversary. Our security model is based on models by Boldyreva et al. [13]
and Schuldt et al. [73]. Our security model integrates components of both models, along
with some modifications specifically tailored toward trapdoor hash-based proxy signature
schemes. Similar to the models by Boldyreva et al. and Schuldt et al., our model does not
require the adversary to have knowledge of the private key of dishonest users playing the
security game, i.e., our model is not in the registered key model. Thus, our model captures
attacks where the adversary registers public keys for which the corresponding private key
is not known [73]. Also, similar to prior models, our underlying security game involves an
adversary that has the ability to play the role of any arbitrary entity except a single honest
entity. The adversary attempts to forge a regular or a proxy signature of the single honest
entity. The adversary is given access to standard and proxy signing oracle. The adversary
can interact with the honest entity multiple times playing the role of different entities each
time.
The issue of proxy signing key exposure differentiates our security model from models
by Boldyreva et al. and Schuldt et al. Schuldt et al. were the first to model the possibility
of proxy signing key exposure in proxy signature schemes — the adversary is given the
capability to gain knowledge of proxy signing keys, while playing the security game with an
honest entity, which can be potentially used to forge standard or proxy signatures. Schuldt
et al. argue that proxy signatures are often used in applications where signing is performed
in hostile environments. While secure storage is available for a proxy’s long-term secret key,
the proxy signing key, stored in a less trusted device, is vulnerable to exposure/compromise.
Thus, secure proxy signatures should not leak information about the long-term key of the
proxy when the proxy signing key is exposed.
While in Schuldt et al.’s model, any arbitrary proxy signing key of the honest entity can
be exposed to the adversary, Boldyreva et al.’s model only allows exposure of proxy signing
keys that are generated during self-delegation by the honest entity. The different treatment
of proxy key exposure arises because, the technique to avoid leakage of information about
the long-term key in presence of proxy signing key exposure requires a fresh proxy key pair
to be generated during delegation which, in case of Boldyreva et al., only occurs during self
delegation, whereas, in case of Schuldt et al., occurs during every delegation run.
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Unlike the schemes by Boldyreva et al., Schuldt et al. and other common proxy signature
schemes [43, 47, 56], the proposed trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme does not
involve generation of any proxy signing key. In the proposed scheme, the proxy finds
collisions between trapdoor hashes of the warrant and the given message, and tags the
result of the collision along with the delegation certificate to collectively generate a proxy
signature. Collision computation involves use of the long-term trapdoor key. Thus, all
signature generation operations in the proposed scheme involve use of long-term keys1 .
This excludes our scheme from application in environments where delegation is performed to
protect long-term keys. Fortunately, existing applications of proxy signatures like securing
mobile agent communication, Grid computing, and multi-Cloud systems, are not intended
for protection of long-term keys, but rather for providing authentication (in addition to
authorization) in absence of the original signer in a delegation-based framework. Thus, the
possibility of exposure of proxy signing keys is excluded from our security model. However,
our scheme can be modified to be proven secure in the models allowing key exposure.
Informally, similar to the approaches by Boldyreva et al. and Schuldt et al., we can also
necessitate the generation of a fresh (trapdoor, hash) key pair during each delegation run.
In this case, the long-term private (signing) key of the proxy would only be used to certify
the per-delegation (trapdoor, hash) key pair. As long as a secure signature scheme is used
in the per-delegation certification process, we can allow exposure of per-delegation private
(trapdoor) key without any leakage of information regarding the long-term key.
Security Model. We now formally describe our security model. Let E be a set of entities
containing a single honest entity e. The remaining entities e′ ∈ E − {e} are corrupted by
an adversary A. The goal of the adversary A, modeled as a PPT algorithm, is to output
one or more of the following forgeries:
Type I: A outputs a forged signature of e on a message m′ , where e never signed message
m′ .
Type II: A outputs a forged proxy signature of e on message m′ conforming to warrant
w′ on behalf of an arbitrary entity e′ , where one of the following holds: (1) e′ never
delegated e; (2) e′ delegated e under warrant w 6= w′ ; (3) e′ delegated e under warrant
w′ but e did not generate a proxy signature on m′ under the warrant w′ .
1

We note that the long-term key used for proxy signature generation is not a signing key that is used for
conventional signature generation. Instead, the proxy uses its trapdoor key for proxy signature generation.
The trapdoor key is used exclusively for collision computation and the long-term signing key of proxy is
never used in our scheme.
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Type III: A outputs a forged proxy signature of an arbitrary entity e′ on a message m′
conforming to warrant w′ on behalf of entity e where one of the following holds: (1)
e never delegated e′ as a proxy; (2) e delegated e′ under a different warrant w 6= w′ .
The adversary is allowed to select and register public keys and hash keys for any corrupted
entity e′ , play the role of e′ as a delegator while performing proxy delegation or request
e to participate in a proxy delegation playing the role of a proxy. There is no limitation
on the number of times the adversary can request any two entities in E to perform proxy
delegation. The adversary controls all communications, in the sense that no secure channel
exists between a proxy and a delegator. However, we assume that the channel is reliable
with usual connotations of message delivery. Next, we describe the game that adversary A
plays with entity e in an attempt to forge a standard or proxy signature.
Specifications of the Game. Consider a game GTAP S (λ), where λ is a security parameter.
The game is played by adversary A with entity e in an attempt by A to produce a Type I,
Type II or a Type III forgery.
The game GTAP S (λ) is initialized as follows. All entities in E choose and agree upon
the system public parameters params. Entity e generates its (private, public) key pair
(SKe , P Ke ) and its (trapdoor, hash) key pair (T Ke , HKe ), and registers (P Ke , HKe ) in a
publicly available directory. The adversary A is given access to P Ke , HKe , a signing oracle
OS and a proxy signature generating oracle OP S that are described below. The adversary
creates four empty sets Ms , Mp , E ′ and Dee . In addition, the adversary creates empty sets
Dee′ and De′ e for each e′ ∈ E − {e}. At any point during the game the adversary A can
generate (or derive) the (public, hash) key pair (P Ke′ 6= P Ke , HKe′ 6= HKe ) of an entity
e′ ∈ E − {{e} ∪ E ′ } and register (P Ke′ , HKe′ ) in a publicly available directory. After each
key registration for entity e′ , E ′ is set to E ′ ∪ {e′ }. The game is executed as follows:
The adversary A makes the following requests to the honest entity e in any order and
any number of times.
• Request e to delegate e′ ∈ E ′ : A can request e to delegate A as a proxy, playing the role
of e′ . Entity e executes Delegate(params, SKe , HKe′ ) → (certee′ = hwee′ , ree′ , σe i)
and sends certee′ to A. If Accept(params, certee′ , P Ke , HKe′ ) outputs Accept then
Dee′ is set to Dee′ ∪ {(wee′ , ree′ , σe )}, otherwise A aborts.
• Request e′ ∈ E ′ to delegate e: A can request e to be delegated as a proxy on behalf
of A playing the role of e′ . A executes Delegate(params, SKe′ , HKe ) → (certe′ e =
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hwe′ e , re′ e , σe′ i) and sends certe′ e to e. If Accept(params, certe′ e , P Ke′ , HKe ) outputs
Accept, then De′ e is set to De′ e ∪ {(we′ e , re′ e , σe′ )}, otherwise e aborts.
• Request e to delegate itself: A can request e to delegate itself. Entity e executes
Delegate (params, SKe , HKe ) → (certee = hwee , ree , σe i) and sends certee to A.
If Accept(params, certee , P Ke , HKe ) outputs Accept, then Dee is set to Dee ∪
{(wee , ree , σe )}.
The adversary A makes the following queries to oracles OS and OP S in any order and
any number of times:
• Query oracle OS : A queries oracle OS with message m and obtains a signature σ on
m valid under P Ke . Ms is set to Ms ∪ {m}.
• Query oracle OP S : A queries oracle OP S with message m, warrant wxe , l ∈ N and
x ∈ E ′ ∪ {e} as input. If Dxe [l] is not defined or (wxe , ·, ·) ∈
/ Dxe [l], where Dxe [l] is l-th
element in the set Dxe , the query is invalid and oracle returns ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle
returns σP ← PSigGen(params, Dxe [l], m, T Ke ) and Mp is set to Mp ∪ {(wxe , m)}.
Outcome of the Game. At the completion of the game GTAP S (λ), the adversary outputs
a forgery of the form σ ′ or σP′ . The outcome of the game is decided as follows:
1. If A outputs a Type I forgery, σ ′ on message m′ , which implies [V alid ← SigVer
(params, P Ke , m′ , σ ′ )] ∧ [m′ ∈
/ Ms ], then GTAP S (λ) outputs Success.
2. If A outputs a Type II forgery, σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant w′ under
the delegation parameter cert′ = hw′ , r ′ , σ ′ i, which implies [∃x ∈ E ′ ∪ {e}] ∧ [valid ←
PSigVer(params, σP′ , P Kx , HKe )] ∧ [(w′ , m′ ) ∈
/ Mp ], then GTAP S (λ) outputs Success.
3. If A outputs a Type III forgery, σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant w′
under the delegation parameter cert′ = hw′ , r ′ , σ ′ i which implies [∃x ∈ E ′ ] ∧
[valid ← PSigVer(params, σP′ , P Ke , HKx )] ∧ [(w′ , r ′ , σ ′ ) ∈
/ Dex ], then GTAP S (λ)
outputs Success.
4. Else, GTAP S (λ) outputs Failure.
Adversary A, on input (P Ke , HKe ) and security parameter λ, plays the game GTAP S (λ)
T P S (λ) = P r[Success ← GT P S (λ)]. The
with entity e. Define the advantage of A as: AdvA
A

trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme, TPS is secure against adaptive chosen message
T P S (λ) is negligible for all PPT algorithms A of time complexity polynomial
attack if AdvA

in the security parameter λ.
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4.2.3

Trapdoor hash-based proxy signatures schemes, TPS

Let an entity D act as the delegator, wanting to delegate signing rights to another entity P,
the proxy. Let TH be a trapdoor hash function that computes key exposure-free collisions.
A naı̈ve implementation of the basic idea presented in Section 4.2.1 poses some
weaknesses. During delegation, a delegator generates a signature, σ on the trapdoor hash
of a warrant, TH HK (w, r) using the hash key of a proxy. The proxy can use its trapdoor
key, T K to find hw′ , c, HK ′ i such that TH HK (w, r) = TH HK ′ (w′ , c), essentially forging the
delegator’s signature on a new warrant, w′ of its choice. To prevent this simple forgery, we
require the delegator to generate a signature on TH HK (w, r)||w instead of TH HK (w, r)
during proxy delegation.
w and

w′

Now, even though the proxy can find a collision between

such that TH HK (w, r) = TH HK ′ (w′ , c), we observe that TH HK (w, r)||w 6=

TH HK ′ (w′ , c)||w′ , thus, preventing the forgery.
With the aforementioned fix in place, after a proxy obtains the delegator’s signature
σ on m = TH HK (w, r)||w, the proxy can still produce a forged standard signature of the
delegator by outputting σ on m′ = TH HK ′ (w′ , c)||w (existential forgery), where w′ 6= w
and TH HK (w, r) = TH HK ′ (w′ , c). To avoid this, we introduce a mechanism to differentiate
between delegator’s standard signatures and signatures created for delegation, by requiring
that standard signatures be generated on 1||m instead of m, similar to the technique
introduced by Boldyreva et al. [13].
We now present a generic construction of trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme,
TPS. The ParGen and KeyGen algorithms are as defined in Definition 4.2.1. The system
public parameters are given by params. The delegator D’s long-term (private, public) key
pair is given by (SK, P K). The proxy P’s long-term (trapdoor, hash) key pair is given
by (T K, HK). The remaining components of the proposed trapdoor hash-based proxy
signature scheme, TPS are defined as follows:
TPS.SigGen: Given system parameters params, and a message m, the delegator performs
the standard signing operation of the underlying signature scheme on 1||m using its
secret key, SK and outputs the signature σ.
TPS.SigVer: Given system parameters params, a message m, public key P K and a candidate
signature σ, an entity prepends 1 to m and verifies σ on 1||m under public key P K
following the verification algorithm of the underlying signature scheme. If verification
is successful the verifier outputs V alid, otherwise outputs Invalid.
TPS.Delegate: The delegator D delegates a proxy P as follows:
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1. Chooses a random element r and generates a warrant w containing identities D,
P and a message space descriptor.
2. Computes trapdoor hash of warrant as TH HK (w, r), where HK is the hash key
of P, and generates a signature σ on h = TH HK (w, r)||w using its private key
SK.
3. Sends the delegation certificate cert = hσ, w, ri to P.
TPS.Accept: After receiving the delegation parameters from D, the proxy P performs the
following operations:
1. Checks whether warrant w conforms to the agreement with D. If check fails,
outputs hReject, ⊥i and aborts.
2. Computes TH HK (w, r) and sets h = TH HK (w, r)||w.
3. Verifies signature σ on h under public key P K. If verification is successful outputs
hAccept, certi, otherwise, outputs hReject, ⊥i.
TPS.PSigGen: Given a message m, and delegation certificate cert, P generates a proxy
signature σP as follows:
1. Checks whether the message m conforms to restrictions specified in the warrant
w. If check fails, aborts.
2. Computes collision parameter c, and HK ′ using T K such that TH HK (w, r) =
TH HK ′ (m, c), where T K is the trapdoor key of P.
3. Outputs the proxy signature σP = hcert, m, c, HK ′ i on the message m conforming to warrant w.
TPS.PSigVer: Given a proxy signature σP , an entity can verify the delegation agreement,
identify the proxy and verify the proxy signature on message m conforming to warrant
w as follows:
1. Checks whether the message m conforms to warrant specifications w. If check
fails, outputs Invalid and aborts.
2. Looks up the hash key HK of P and public key P K of D from a publicly available
directory.
3. Computes TH HK (w, r), sets h = TH HK (w, r)||w and verifies signature, σ on h
under public key P K. If verification fails, outputs Invalid and aborts.
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4. Otherwise, computes TH HK ′ (m, c) and checks whether TH HK ′ (m, c) = TH HK (w, r).
If check fails, outputs Invalid, otherwise, outputs Valid.
To verify P’s subsequent proxy signature, σP = hcert, m′′ , c′′ , HK ′′ i on message m′′ , an
entity only computes TH HK ′′ (m′′ , c′′ ) and checks whether the hash value equals h. If the
hash values are equal, the proxy signature is valid. Verification of σ on h||w is not repeated.
The security of the proposed proxy signature scheme can be summarized by the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.2.1. The proposed proxy signature scheme, TPS, is secure provided that the
underlying standard signature scheme is secure (as defined in [13]), and TH is semantically
secure, key-exposure-resistant, collision-forgery-resistant and ephemeral-collision-forgeryresistant.
Proof:

We show that for every adversary A against the trapdoor hash-based proxy

T P S (λ), we can construct an
signature scheme, TPS, with non-negligible advantage AdvA

adversary B, which breaks the underlying signature scheme, or forges a trapdoor collision
with non-negligible advantage. All entities agree upon system parameters params. Entity
e generates its (private, public) key pair (SKe , P Ke ) and the (trapdoor, hash) key pair
(T Ke , HKe ). The adversary B is given access to a signing oracle OSe that generates
standard signatures using SKe by performing the signing operation of the underlying
signature scheme and a trapdoor collision oracle OCLe that generates collisions for the
trapdoor hash function associated with HKe (i.e., OCLe takes messages m, m′ , and random
element r as inputs and outputs hc, HK ′ i such that T HHKe (m, r) = T HHK ′ (m′ , c)).
Adversary B runs A (both modelled as PPT algorithms) on inputs P Ke and HKe and
answers requests and queries made by A as follows:
• When adversary A requests B to register P Ke′ 6= P Ke and HKe′ 6= HKe , B stores
P Ke′ and HKe′ (SKe′ and T Ke′ are unknown to B). B initializes two empty sets Dee′
and De′ e . E ′ is set to E ′ ∪ {e′ }.
• When A requests e to designate A as a proxy, playing the role of e′ ∈ E ′ , B
does the following: (1) Creates a warrant wee′ and chooses ree′ ; (2) Computes
m = TH HKe′ (wee′ , ree′ e )||wee′ and queries oracle OSe with m as input and obtains
a signature σe (using SKe ) on m; (3) Sends certee′ = hwee′ , ree′ , σe i to A. A checks
whether σe is a valid signature on m under P Ke . If σe is valid, then Dee′ is set to
Dee′ ∪ {certee′ }, otherwise B aborts.
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• When A requests e to be designated as a proxy on behalf of A playing the role of e′ ∈
E ′ , A does the following: (1) Creates a warrant we′ e and chooses re′ e ; (2) Generates
a signature σe′ on m = TH HKe (we′ e , re′ e )||we′ e ; (3) Sends certe′ e = hwe′ e , re′ e , σe′ i to
B. B checks whether σe′ is a valid signature on m under P Ke′ . If σe′ is valid, then
De′ e is set to De′ e ∪ {certe′ e }, otherwise, B aborts.
• When A requests e to designate itself, B does the following: (1) Creates a warrant
wee and chooses ree ; (2) Computes m = TH HKe (wee , ree )||wee and queries oracle OSe
with m as input and obtains a signature σe (using SKe ) on m; B sends certe′ e =
hwee , ree , σe i to A. A checks whether σe is a valid signature on m under P Ke . If σe
is valid, then Dee is set to Dee ∪ {certee }, otherwise B aborts.
• When A queries oracle OS with message m, B makes the query 1||m to its signing
oracle OSe and forwards the response σe to A. Ms is set to Ms ∪ {m}.
• When A queries oracle OP S with message m, warrant wxe , l ∈ N and x ∈ E ′ ∪ {e} as
input, B responds as follows: If Dxe [l] is not defined or (wxe , ·, ·) ∈
/ Dxe [l], the query is
invalid and B returns ⊥. Otherwise B parses Dxe [l] as (wxe , rxe , σx ). B queries oracle
OCLe with inputs m, wxe , rxe to obtain a response hc, HK ′ i. B returns the proxy
signature σP = hcertxe , m, c, HK ′ i to A. Mp is set to Mp ∪ {(wxe , m)}.
The adversary outputs a forgery of the form σ ′ or σP′ . If A’s forgery is a Type I forgery
of the form σ ′ on message m′ , the signature σ ′ is in fact a forged standard signature on
message 1||m′ valid under public key P Ke , such that 1||m′ ∈
/ Ms . B outputs the forgery σ ′
on message 1||m′ valid under P Ke .
If A’s forgery is a Type II forgery of the form σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant
w′ , B parses σP′ as hcert′ , m′ , c′ , HK ′ i. Next, B parses cert′ as hw′ , r ′ , σ ′ i, where σ ′ is a
signature on TH HKe (w′ , r ′ ) valid under P Kx (x ∈ E ′ ∪ {e}) and (w′ , m′ ) ∈
/ Mp . B outputs
a collision forgery hw′ , r ′ , m′ , c′ , HK ′ i such that TH HKe (w′ , r ′ ) = TH HK ′ (m′ , c′ ), under the
hash key HKe .
If A’s forgery is a Type III forgery of the form σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant
w′ , B parses σP′ as hcert′ , m′ , c′ , HK ′ i. Next, B parses cert′ as hw′ , r ′ , σ ′ i, where σ ′ is a
signature on TH HK (w′ , r ′ )||w′ (x ∈ E ′ ) valid under P Ke and cert′ ∈
/ Dex . B outputs the
forgery σ ′ on message m′ = T HHK (w′ , r ′ )||w′ valid under public key P Ke .
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4.3

A discrete log-based proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS

Performance sensitive settings, such as mobile agent applications [47, 46], require efficient
proxy signature. In this chapter, we demonstrate the potential of our generic approach [cf.
Section 4.2.3] to create practical instances by using cryptographic primitives from discrete
log-based cryptosystem to construct an efficient trapdoor hash-based proxy signature
scheme.
Let an entity D act as the delegator, wanting to delegate signing rights to another entity
P, the proxy. The ParGen, KeyGen, Delegate, Accept, PSigGen and PSigVer algorithms of
trapdoor hash-based proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS, are executed as follows:
DL-TPS.ParGen: Entities choose and agree upon common system public parameters params =
hp, q, α, H, Gi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively, q | p − 1,
α is an element of order q in Z∗p and H, G : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q are cryptographic hash
functions.
DL-TPS.KeyGen: The delegator D chooses its long-term private key x ∈R Z∗q and computes
the corresponding long-term public key as X = αx ∈ Z∗p . The proxy P chooses its
long-term trapdoor key y ∈R Z∗q and computes the corresponding long-term hash key
as Y = αy ∈ Z∗p .
DL-TPS.SigGen: Given system parameters params, a message m the delegator D generates
a standard signature on m as follows:
1. Choose an ephemeral private key k ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral public key r = αk ∈ Z∗p .
2. Solve for t in the equation: t ≡ k + xH(m||r) mod q (this is the well-known
DL-Schnorr [72] signature scheme). Signature on m is given by σ = ht, ri.
DL-TPS.SigVer: Given a candidate signature σ on message m, system parameters params
and public key X, verification proceeds as follows:
1. If r = αt X −H(m||r) mod q, the signature σ = ht, ri on message m is valid under
the public key X. Output V alid.
2. Otherwise, output Invalid and abort.
DL-TPS.Delegate: The delegator D delegates a proxy P as follows:
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1. Choose an ephemeral private key k ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral public key r = αk ∈ Z∗p .
2. Generate a warrant w and compute the trapdoor hash of w as TH Y (w, r) =
αhw Y r mod q, where hw = H(w||Y ). The warrant w specifies restrictions on
the messages the proxy signer is allowed to sign.
3. Solve for t in the equation: t ≡ k + xG(TH Y (w, r)||w||r) mod q (Schnorr [72]type signing).
4. Form the delegation certificate cert containing the signature, σ = ht, ri and
warrant, w, and send cert to P.
DL-TPS.Accept: After receiving the delegation certificate cert = hσ, wi, where σ = ht, ri,
from D, the proxy P performs the following operations:
1. Check whether warrant w conforms to the agreement with D. If check fails,
output hReject, ⊥i and abort.
2. Compute TH Y (w, r) = αhw +yr mod q and h = G(TH Y (w, r)||w||r).
3. If r = αt X −h mod q, the signature σ = ht, ri on h is valid under the public key
X of D. Output hAccept, certi. Otherwise, output hReject, ⊥i.
DL-TPS.PSigGen: Given a message m, P generates a proxy signature σP as follows:
1. Check whether the message m conforms to restrictions specified in the warrant
w. If check fails, abort.
2. Choose an ephemeral trapdoor key z ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral hash key Z = αz ∈ Z∗p .
3. Compute hm = H(m||Z) and using trapdoor key y and ephemeral key z, solve
for c in the equation: c = z −1 (hw − hm + yr) mod q.
4. The proxy signature σP is the tuple hcert, m, c, hm i on the message m conforming
to warrant w. Send σP to the verifier V.
DL-TPS.PSigVer: Given a proxy signature σP , V can verify the delegation agreement,
identify the proxy and verify the proxy signature on message m conforming to warrant
w as follows:
1. Check whether the message m conforms to warrant w. If check fails, output
Invalid and abort.
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2. Look up the hash key Y of P from a publicly available directory. Compute
TH Y (w, r) = αhw Y r mod q and h = G(TH Y (w, r)||w||r).
3. Compute r ′ = αt X −h mod q. If r ′ 6= r mod q, output Invalid and abort.
−1

4. Compute Z ′ = α(hw −hm )c Y rc

−1

mod p. Check whether hm = H(m||Z ′ ). If

check fails, output Invalid. Otherwise, output Valid.
To verify P’s subsequent proxy signatures on a new message m, the verifier V only
−1

computes Z ′ = α(hw −hm )c Y rc

−1

mod p and checks whether hm = H(m||Z ′ ). If the hash

values are equal, the proxy signature is valid. Next, we perform a detailed analysis of the
proposed proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS.
4.4

Analysis of the DL-TPS proxy signature scheme

We present a theoretical analysis of the proposed DL-based proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS,
including correctness, security and performance.
4.4.1

Correctness

A proxy signature scheme constructed following the procedures in Section 4.2 is correct if
an arbitrary proxy signature, σP = hcert, m, c, hm i on message m conforming to warrant w,
generated by a proxy P on behalf of D, passes the proxy signature verification procedure DLTPS.PSigVer, using the long term public key of D and the long-term hash key of P, provided:
(1) All entities choose and agree upon the system public parameters params = hp, q, α, H, Gi;
(2) D and P honestly execute key generation algorithm DL-TPS.KeyGen; (3) D honestly
executes proxy delegation signature generation algorithm, DL-TPS.Delegate scheme, and
(4) P honestly uses his long-term trapdoor key y and ephemeral trapdoor key z to compute
c such that TH Y (w, r) = TH Z (m, c).
Proposition 4.4.1. The proposed DL-based proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS is correct.
Proof: Provided the aforementioned correctness conditions hold, the proxy signature
σP = hcert, m, c, hm i on message m conforming to warrant w passes the proxy signature
verification procedure DL-TPS.PSigVer, using the long-term public key of D and the longterm hash key of P if the following conditions are met: (1) D’s signature σ on h =
G(TH Y (w, r)||w||r) mod q passes verification following the signature verification algorithm
of DL-TPS.Accept and (2) The hash value, TH Y (w, r) mod q equals TH Z (m, c) mod q.
We first show that the signature verification algorithm of DL-TPS.Accept executed on the
signature σ = ht, ri on h, under the public key X outputs hcert, Accepti. During verification
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of σ we observe:
αt X −h = α(k+xh−hx) = αk = r
Thus, the signature σ on h is valid under public key of D.
Next we show that the value of c ∈ Z∗q computed during execution of DL-TPS.PSigGen
represents a collision between TH Y (w, r) and TH Z (m, c). This can be seen as follows:
TH Z (m, c) = αhm +zc = αhm +z(z

−1 (h

w −hm +yr))

= αhw +yr = TH Y (w, r)

What remains to be shown is that the quantity Z ′ computed during execution of DLTPS.PSigVer equals the ephemeral hash key Z computed by the proxy during execution
of DL-TPS.PSigGen. This can be seen as follows:
−1

α(hw −hm )c Y rc

−1

= αc

−1 (h

w −hm +yr)

−1 (h

= αz(hw −hm +yr)

w −hm +yr)

= αz = Z

where, c = z −1 (hw − hm + yr) mod q.
4.4.2

Security

In this section we provide a detailed security analysis of the the proposed DL-based proxy
signature scheme DL-TPS, following notions of security against adaptive chosen message
attack.
Given that DL-MTH exhibits properties of collision forgery resistance, ephemeral collision
forgery resistance, key exposure resistance and semantic security, and the provable security
guarantees provided by the well-known DL-Schnorr [72] signature scheme, we state and
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.2. The DL-based proxy signature scheme DL-TPS is secure against adaptive
chosen message attack in the random oracle model [11] under the DL assumption.
Proof:

We show that for every adversary A against the DL-based proxy signature

DL−T P S
(λ), we can construct an adversary B,
scheme with non-negligible advantage, AdvA

which solves the DL problem with non-negligible advantage AdvBDL (λ). The hash functions
H and G behave as a random oracles (denoted as OH and OG , respectively). The system
parameter param is given as the tuple hp, q, α, H, Gi. Entity e generates its (private, public)
key pair (SKe , P Ke ) and the (trapdoor, hash) key pair (T Ke , HKe ). The adversary B is
given access to the public keys P Ke and HKe , and simulates signing oracle, OS , the proxy
signature generating oracle, OP S and the hashing oracles, OH and OG .
Adversary B runs A (both modelled as PPT algorithms) on inputs P Ke and HKe and
answers requests and queries made by A as follows:
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• When adversary A requests B to register P Ke′ 6= P Ke and HKe′ 6= HKe , B stores
P Ke′ and HKe′ (SKe′ and T Ke′ are unknown to B). B initializes two empty sets Dee′
and De′ e . E ′ is set to E ′ ∪ {e′ }.
• When A requests e to designate A as a proxy, playing the role of e′ ∈ E ′ , B does the following: (1) Creates a warrant wee′ ; (2) Chooses h, t ∈R Z∗q and computes r = αt P Ke−h
mod p; (3) If H(wee′ ||HKe′ ) is defined, then retrieves hwee′ = H(wee′ ||HKe′ ), otherwise chooses hwee′ ∈R Z∗q , sets H(wee′ ||HKe′ ) = hwee′ and stores hwee′ in the hash entry
for H(wee′ ||HKe′ ); (4) Computes TH HKe′ (wee′ , r); (5) If G(TH HKe′ (wee′ , r)||wee′ ||r)
is defined, then B aborts. Otherwise sets G(TH HKe′ (wee′ , r)||wee′ ||r) = h and stores
h in its hash entry; (6) Sets σe = ht, ri and sends certee′ = hwee′ , σe i to A. A checks
whether σe is a valid signature on the hash, h (obtained by querying OG with inputs
wee′ , r and HKe′ ) under P Ke . If σe is valid, then Dee′ is set to Dee′ ∪ {certee′ },
otherwise B aborts.
• When A requests e to be designated as a proxy on behalf of A playing the role of
e′ ∈ E ′ , A does the following: (1) Creates a warrant we′ e ; (2) Chooses k ∈R Z∗q
and computes αk ; (3) Queries oracle OG with we′ e , r and HKe as inputs to obtain
h = G(TH HKe (we′ e , r)||we′ e ||r), and (4) Generates a signature σe′ = ht, ri (using
SKe′ ) on h. A sends certe′ e = hwe′ e , σe′ i to B. B checks whether σe′ is a valid signature
on h under P Ke . If σe′ is valid, then De′ e is set to De′ e ∪{certe′ e }, otherwise, B aborts.
• When A requests e to designate itself, B does the following: (1) Creates a warrant
wee ; (2) Chooses h, t ∈R Z∗q and computes r = αt P Ke−h mod p; (3) If H(wee )
is defined, then retrieves hwee = H(wee ||HKe ), otherwise chooses hwee ∈R Z∗q ,
sets H(wee ||HKe ) = hwee and stores hwee in the hash entry for H(wee ||HKe ); (4)
Computes TH HKe (wee , r); (5) If G(TH HKe (wee , r)||wee ||r) is defined, then aborts,
otherwise sets G(TH HKe (wee , r)||wee ||r) = h and stores h in its hash entry; (6) Sets
σe = ht, ri and sends certee = hwee , σe i to A. A checks whether σe is a valid signature
on hash of wee (obtained by querying OG with inputs wee ,r and HKe ) under P Ke . If
σe is valid, then Dee is set to Dee ∪ {certee }, otherwise B aborts.
• When A queries oracle OS with message m, B does the following: (1) Chooses t, h ∈R
Z∗q and computes r = αt P Ke−h mod p; (2) Checks whether H(m||r) is defined, and
if so, aborts; (3) Otherwise, sets H(m||r) = h and σe = ht, ri. B sends σe to A. Ms
is set to Ms ∪ {m}.
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• When A queries oracle OP S with message m, warrant wxe , l ∈ N and x ∈ E ′ ∪ {e} as
input, B responds as follows: If Dxe [l] is not defined or (wxe , ·) ∈
/ Dxe [l], the query is
invalid and B returns ⊥. Otherwise, B parses Dxe [l] as (wxe , σx = ht, ri), and performs
the following operations: (1) Chooses c ∈R Z∗q ; (2) Retrieves h and hwxe , where
h = G(TH HKe (wxe , r)||wxe ||r) and hwxe = H(wxe ||HKe ); (3) Chooses hm ∈R Z∗q and
−1

computes Z = α(hwxe −hm )c HKerc

−1

mod p; (4) If H(m||Z) is defined then aborts,

otherwise sets H(m||Z) = hm and stores hm in the hash entry for H(m||Z). B sends
σP = hwxe , σx , m, c, hm i, to A. Mp is set to Mp ∪ {(wxe , m)}.
• When A queries oracle OG with message m, an element r and hash key HKx (x ∈
E ′ ∪ {e}) as inputs, B returns h if G(TH HKx (m, r)||m||r) is defined, i.e., ∃h such that
h = G(TH HKx (m, r)||m||r). Otherwise, B does the following: (1) If H(m||HKx ) is defined, retrieves hm = H(m||HKx ), otherwise, chooses hm ∈R Z∗q , sets H(m||HKx ) =
hm and stores hm in the hash entry for H(m||HKx ); (2) Uses HKx , r, hm to compute
TH HKx (m, r); (3) Chooses h ∈R Z∗q , sets G(TH HKx (m, r)||m||r) = h, stores h in the
hash entry for G(TH HKx (m, r)||m||r) and returns h to A.
• When A queries oracle OH with message m and element r as inputs, B returns h
if H(m||r) is defined, that is if ∃h such that h = H(m||r). Otherwise, B chooses
h ∈R Z∗q , sets H(m||r) = h, stores h as the hash entry for H(m||r) and returns h to
A.
• When A queries oracle OH with message m as input, B returns h if H(m) is defined,
that is if ∃h such that h = H(m). Otherwise, B chooses h ∈R Z∗q , sets H(m) = h,
stores h as the hash entry for H(m) and returns h to A.
The adversary outputs a forgery of the form σ ′ or σP′ . If A’s forgery is a Type I forgery
of the form σ ′ on message m′ , B uses the (provably secure) forged Schnorr signature [72] to
break the discrete log problem and output SKe .
If A’s forgery is a Type II forgery of the form σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant
w′ , B parses σP′ as hσ ′ , c′ , h′m i and σ ′ as hr ′ , t′ i. B computes hw′ = H(w′ ||HKe ) and
′

Z ′ = α(hw′ −hm )c

′ −1

′ ′ −1

HKer c

mod p. Since, (w′ , m′ ) ∈
/ Mp we know that hw′ , r ′ , m′ , c′ , Z ′ i

represents a collision forgery, i.e., TH HKe (w′ , r ′ ) = TH Z ′ (m′ , c′ ), where Z ′ is computed
as in DL-TPS.PSigVer. Following Theorem 3.4.1, B uses the forged collision to break the
discrete log problem and output T Ke corresponding to HKe .
If A’s forgery is a Type III forgery of the form σP′ on message m′ conforming to warrant
w′ , B parses σP′ as hσ ′ , c′ , h′m i and σ ′ as hr ′ , t′ i. In this case, e is the delegator and e′ ∈ E ′
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′

is the proxy. If A did not make the query (w′ , r ′ , HKe′ ), where r ′ = αk mod q, to oracle
OG , then B aborts. Otherwise, let h′ be the response B gave when A made this query. B
rewinds A to the point where A makes the (w′ , r ′ , HKe′ ) query to OG and gives A a new
randomly chosen value h′′ 6= h′ ∈R Z∗q . B continues the execution of A, until A outputs
a forgery σP′′ on message m′ conforming to warrant w′ . If the forgery is not of the form
hσ ′′ , ·, ·i, where σ ′′ = hr ′ , t′′ i, then B aborts. Otherwise, B computes the private key SKe
corresponding to P Ke of the honest entity as: SKe = (t′ − t′′ )(h′ − h′′ )−1 . Thus, B is able
to solve the discrete logarithm problem with non-negligible probability.
4.4.3

Performance

Table 4.1: Performance comparison of proposed proxy signature scheme DL-TPS with existing
schemes.
Delegation
Proxy Sig Gen
Proxy Sig Ver
Public key size (bits)
Proxy Sig size (bits)
Secure Channel
Provably Secure

MUO [57]
3e
1e
4e

Y
N

KPW [43] PH [69]
3e
4e
1e
1e
3e
3e
2048
1344
N
N
Y
N

MLKK) [48]
4e
1e
4e
1504
N
N

HSMW [39]
3s + 2p
5s
5p
1532
480
N
Y

ZNS [83]
2s + 2p
2s
1s + 2p
1532
160
N
N

DL-TPS
6e
1e
5e(2e)
2048
640
N
Y

Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the proposed proxy signature scheme, DL-TPS, with
those developed by Mambo et al.

(MUO) [57], Kim et al.

(KPW) [43], Petersen et al.

(PH) [69], Lee et al. (MLKK) [48], Huang et al. (HSMW) [39] and Zhang et al. (ZNS) [83]. In
Table 4.1, the term e denotes the cost of modular exponentiation with a 160-bit exponent,
s denotes the cost of scalar multiplications and p denotes the cost of pairing computation.
All computation, storage and communication costs are based on a security benchmark of
1024-bits. The size of proxy signature shown in the table excludes the size of warrant and
message for all schemes. For the DL-TPS scheme, the cost of verifying initial and subsequent
proxy signatures exchanged between any pair of proxy and verifier are different. The table
entry for proxy signature verification cost for the DL-TPS scheme shows the cost of verifying
subsequent proxy signatures exchanged between any pair of proxy and verifier in parenthesis
(and the cost of initial proxy signature verification outside parenthesis).
The performance characteristics of the KPW scheme is the same as its provably secure
variant by Boldyreva et al. [13] and its proxy non-designated variant by Lee et al. [47]. The
scheme by Lee et al. [47], however, requires a secure communication channel between the
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delegator and the proxy. Lee et al. (MLKK) [48] proposed a variant of the scheme in [47] to
overcome this weakness. For the sake of uniformity in comparison, we consider a security
benchmark of 1024 bits — the system public parameters of DL-TPS, MUO, KPW, MLKK, and PH
are given by the tuple params = hp, q, αi, where p and q are 1024-bit and 160-bit primes,
respectively, and α is an element of order q in Z∗p . Also, we assume the employment of
Schnorr signature for proxy signature generation in the MUO, KPW, PH and MLKK schemes.
We observe that the proposed DL-TPS scheme achieves the best proxy signature
verification efficiency for subsequent messages exchanged between any pair of proxy and
verifier, while maintaining comparable signature generation performance.

Our proxy

signature verification is 33% more efficient compared to the next most efficient proxy
signature schemes, KPW and PH. Although the delegation process is expensive in DL-TPS,
we argue that this step would not be performed often and the majority of computational
overhead would be caused by proxy signature generations and verifications. The HSMW and
ZNS schemes use considerably more expensive bilinear pairing operations in the delegation
and proxy signature verification phases. To the best of our knowledge, the best known
result for computing a single Tate pairing equals approximately 11110 multiplications in
Zq , where q is a 171-bit prime (for security benchmark of 1024-bits) [8]. Moreover, the HSMW
requires the largest amount of space (10KB) for storage of system parameters [52].
For schemes, DL-TPS, MUO, KPW, MLKK and PH, the size of the long-term public key,
excluding shared components (primes p and q) equals 2048-bits. The pairing-based schemes,
HSMW and ZNS, use public keys of size 1532-bits.
The proposed DL-TPS scheme also produces the smallest proxy signatures compared to
MUO, KPW, PH and MLKK. Even though the HSMW and ZNS schemes produce smaller signatures,
they suffer from significant computational overhead. Thus, the DL-TPS scheme achieves
the best all-round performance compared with other schemes in the literature while being
provably secure.
4.5

Summary

We presented a simple and elegant technique to construct a provably secure proxy signature
using trapdoor hash functions that can be used to authenticate and authorize agents acting
on behalf of users in agent-based computing systems. Unlike most common proxy signature
schemes [13, 47, 43], the proxy signing key pair is not derived from the delegator’s signature
during the proxy delegation phase. Instead of generating a signature on the message in
the traditional sense, the proxy uses its trapdoor key (known exclusively to itself) to find
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a trapdoor collision between the trapdoor hash of the warrant and the given message. We
provided a rigorous security analysis of the proposed generic construction TPS.
We instantiated our scheme using primitives from discrete log-based cryptosystem to
yield the DL-TPS proxy signature scheme. We provided definitions, security specifications
and performed a theoretical analysis of the proposed scheme, DL-TPS, including correctness,
security and performance. As shown in Table 4.1, DL-TPS yields superior performance in
terms of proxy signature verification compared to the schemes in [13, 39, 43, 47, 57, 69, 83]
and produces the smallest proxy signatures compared to schemes in [13, 43, 47, 48, 57, 69].
We believe that our work plays a crucial role in providing authorization and authentication
of agents in Multi-Agent Systems. In the future we plan to further investigate improvements
in efficiency of our proposed technique through the use of primitives from LFSR-based
cryptosystems [24, 35].
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Chapter 5

Efficient stream authentication using trapdoor hash functions

5.1

Introduction

Many Web-based services involve distribution of content like digital audio, video, software,
games, stock quotes, streaming presentations and live news feeds through distributed
networking technologies such as content distribution networks (CDNs), multicast networks
and peer-to-peer networks. Unfortunately, these modern distributed systems, designed to
distribute content to a large group of users, also provide an ideal platform for adversarial
users to launch a myriad of attacks with widespread consequences.

Adversaries can

masquerade as legitimate content providers to distribute malicious content possibly infected
with worms, viruses, etc. Adversaries can also place themselves in the content distribution
path, for example, by compromising Web caches [53], and modify the content in ways that
can potentially harm client devices. Authenticating the content plays a crucial role in
preventing these attacks.
Although CDNs like Akamai employ mechanisms for providing physical security, host
system security, access control, software reliability and integrity, and 24x7 monitoring and
response, these mechanisms are primarily designed for providing security of the CDN’s
service network infrastructure and ensure proper functioning of its distributed network
of servers rather than protecting content distributed through the CDN [2]. The task of
protecting content is the responsibility of content providers. Unfortunately, much of the
content provided over the Internet today is transmitted without any protection mechanism.
For instance Amazon, YouTube and many other highly popular content providers distribute
their content over an insecure connection. Although encryption is not necessary in the
instances like browsing products sold by Amazon and videos on YouTube, authenticating
content is becoming increasingly necessary.

Popular content providers often provide

highly personalized user experience by inserting targeted advertisements and dynamically
generated content. Today the majority of mass-viewed content is dynamically generated and
multimedia-rich that include combination of text, audio, still images, animation, video, and
interactive forms that are gathered from a myriad of sources, assembled and presented to
the user. In such scenarios, malicious modification of content by malicious sources becomes
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a legitimate threat. To highlight this point, recently, Google and MSN (Microsoft(R))
were observed to be distributing malware after attackers were able to masquerading as a
legitimate advertising provider and inserting malicious advertisements (by exploiting two
Internet Explorer, one Java, and four Adobe Reader flaws) that installed the HDD Plus
malware [16]. YouTube was also a victim of an attack where malicious code was inserted
into pages (by exploiting a cross-site scripting vulnerability) displaying the targeted videos
that would launch when users opened the video clip redirecting users to pornographic sites
and display falsified news alerts [36]. While flaws in software that were exploited were
eventually patched, these attacks could be prevented by using authentication mechanisms
to protect the content.
Using conventional techniques for message authentication require the sender and the
receiver to have the ability to store the entire message before processing the message.
However, in most instances of distributing content, like digitized multimedia, the content
provider transmits the content in the form of digital streams that a receiver is required to
consume at more or less the stream arrival rate without excessive delay. To protect such
delay-sensitive digital streams against malicious attacks, security mechanisms need to be
designed to process long sequence of bits in an efficient manner that allows the receiver
to verify the authenticity of the stream in portions (to avoid possessing the entire stream
before verification) without excessive processing delays associated with each portion of the
stream. This is typically done by dividing the stream into blocks (or chunks) and using an
efficient security mechanism to secure each block of data. In this chapter, we focus on the
problem of efficient stream authentication using digital signatures. The goal is to provide
integrity, origin authentication, and non-repudiation for individual blocks that comprise a
digital stream.
5.1.1

Problem statement

Efficient authentication of stream poses several challenges:
1. Authentication of delay-sensitive streams requires high verification rates which
translates to requiring minimal computational overhead to verify individual blocks
and avoiding excessive accumulation of data in buffers before verification can proceed.
For instance, to maintain jitter-free playback of on-demand media distributed through
CDN’s, per-block verification rates at client devices must equal or exceed the rate at
which blocks arrive at the device.
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2. For real-time generated digital streams, a sender must be able to sign a block as soon
as it is generated with minimal computational overhead. For instance, to prevent
delays in distribution of real-time content, like stock quotes and live news feeds, that
can influence critical business decisions, per-block signing rates at content originators
must exceed the rate at which blocks are generated.
3. Stream transmission is typically done using unreliable transport protocols, like UDP,
to provide a high throughput, which can cause loss of datagrams during transmission.
Thus, stream authentication mechanisms must be designed to tolerate arbitrary loss
of data blocks without affecting the ability of a receiver to verify remaining received
blocks.
4. Authenticating information such as signatures and hash values placed within a block
(which we call per-block communication overhead) must be limited to a small, constant
size to prevent excessive bandwidth utilization while transmitting signed streams.
5.1.2

Contributions

We propose a novel trapdoor hash-based signature amortization technique for efficient
stream authentication. From a high-level functional perspective, the proposed technique
is the first in the literature to simultaneously provide the following features:
1. The proposed technique tolerates out-of-order arrival of blocks in the stream and is
resilient to transmission losses of an arbitrary number of intermediate blocks, without
affecting the verifiability of remaining blocks in the stream. These properties stem
from the ability of the receiver to verify each block based on the contents of any
previously received block.
2. Our technique minimizes delays in transmitting a stream following the block-signing
process and playback of the stream following the block-verification process. We do
this by designing highly efficient block signing and verification procedures that require
constant number of operations and limited memory.
3. The proposed technique limits communication overhead incurred while sending the
authenticating material to a small, constant-sized signature that is augmented to
each block in the stream. Moreover, we avoid wastage of bandwidth by not needing
redundant placement of the same authenticating information in multiple blocks.
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The proposed technique represents the first known attempt in the literature to use trapdoor
hash functions for building a signature amortization scheme. Trapdoor hash functions
provide the unique capability to find collisions between hashes of different messages using
a secret trapdoor key. We use this capability to design a signature amortization technique
where we compute a signature on the trapdoor hash of a block and amortize it over multiple
blocks by finding trapdoor collisions with the hash of the signed block. The receiver verifies
the authenticity of a block by computing its trapdoor hash value and comparing it with the
hash value of any other block in the stream. The proposed technique ensures authenticity
of the stream as no other entity besides the sender can generate the collisions without
knowledge of the secret key. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed technique to build
a practical stream authentication scheme by constructing a discrete-log based instantiation
of the proposed technique.

The resulting stream authentication scheme, called DL-SA,

provides adaptive block verification where the receiver can choose to verify individual blocks,
or batch-verify multiple blocks using less computation at the cost of maintaining a small
buffer. We analyze the security of DL-SA and compare its performance against existing
stream authentication schemes with comparable features. Our security analysis proves
that DL-SA is resistant against forgery attacks under the discrete log assumption. Our
performance comparison demonstrates that DL-SA incurs the least per-block communication
and signature generation overheads compared to the existing schemes.
Chapter Organization: The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. We present
details of using stream authentication mechanisms in CDN’s in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3,
we present a novel trapdoor hash-based signature amortization technique for stream
authentication and discuss security and performance merits of the proposed technique.
In Section 5.4 we present a discrete-log based instantiation of the proposed technique.
We perform a security and performance analysis of discrete-log based scheme, DL-SA, in
Section 5.5. Section 5.6 summarizes the chapter.
5.2

Securing content distribution: a motivating application

In this section, we present an application of using signature amortization for stream
authentication in securing on-demand and real-time content typically distributed via CDN’s.
We highlight specific challenges associated to efficiently authenticating content and later,
present a viable approach toward solving existing problems. This application is not meant
to be the sole motivation for the signature amortization mechanism we are introducing,
but only an illustration of some of its potential uses and benefits. The proposed signature
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amortization technique can also be applied to provide authentication in multicast and peerto-peer networks.
5.2.1

System architecture overview

Figure 5.1 shows a high-level architecture of a CDN. The components include a core data
center, multiple edge caches each serving multiple clients, and the CDN backbone (Internet
or WAN). Edge caches are strategically distributed worldwide to lower content delivery
costs to requesting clients. Both core data centers and edge caches consist of a media server
and a content distribution manager (CDM). The media servers provide storage of media
content. The media server at the core data center serves as the content origin for both
on-demand and real-time content. Clients can include devices like PCs, laptops, PDAs,
cell phones. A CDM provides several functionalities including: (1) Usage tracking service
that enables logging, accounting and billing of content usage. (2) Caching service that
implements content caching techniques. (3) Content processing service that fetches the
requested content from the media server (or stores content into the media server), splits the
media file into blocks (or packet flows), and transmits the blocks to other edge caches or to
clients. (4) Request processing service that provides navigation of the CDN to locate the
content.
When a client requests or subscribes to digital media content, the request is propagated
to the edge cache closest to the client. If the cache contains the requested content, the edge
cache transmits the content to the client. If not, then the request is forwarded to the core
data center, which sends the content to the client. If a content is cacheable, the edge cache
fetches the content from the core data center (or alternatively, the core data center pushes
cacheable content to the edge cache) using an appropriate caching strategy to serve future
requests for the content.
5.2.2

Stream authentication in content distribution networks

Threats involved in distribution of content include masquerading attacks where an adversary
poses as an edge cache or a core data center or a third-party provider that serves
data for dynamically generated content to distribute malicious content (possibly infected
with worms, viruses, etc.), compromising attacks where an adversary takes control of
legitimate content providing hosts (edge cache/core data center/third-party provider)
to inject malicious content and man-in-the-middle attacks where an adversary performs
modification of content during transmission from core data center to the edge cache or from
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of a content distribution network.
the edge cache to the client or from the core data center to the client. Stream authentication
can help prevent these attacks by providing the ability to sign and verify each block in the
stream. All content originates at the core data center and the stream signing mechanism
is implemented at the core CDM as part of its content processing service. We assume the
existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI) responsible for generating certificates for the
core CDM, and distributing the public key and certificate of the core CDM to all verifying
entities. We do not delve into the details of roles and models of a PKI in this discussion.
Referring to Figure 5.1, when a request arrives at the core CDM, the content processing
service retrieves the content from the media server (Step 1 ). The core CDM then splits the
content into a stream of blocks, signs each block (using a suitable signature amortization
technique), places the authenticating information within the block (Step 2 ) and transmits
the signed stream of blocks to the requesting entity (Steps 3 and 5 ). If the content is
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not generated in real-time, the content processing service stores the signed stream at the
media server to prevent redundant signing operations when subsequent requests arrive for
the same content. The stream verification mechanism should be implemented by both the
CDM at an edge cache and at the client machine. When a signed stream arrives at an edge
cache, the content processing service at the CDM verifies individual blocks in the stream
(Step 6 ), stores the signed content into the cache’s media server (Step 7 ), and later, when
a request arrives for the content sends the signed stream to the requesting client (Step 8 ).
Verification of signed streams at edge caches ensures that packets failing verification are not
forwarded to the requesting client thereby preventing unnecessary usage of bandwidth and
processing time at the client machine. When a signed stream arrives at the client machine,
the requesting application verifies each block in the stream and removes the authenticating
information placed inside the block before it plays of the media content (Step 4 ).
To provide reasonable quality of service to clients of CDNs, a stream authentication
mechanism must overcome the following challenges:

(1) Delays in real-time content

transmission can affect client applications such as stock traders that rely on timely delivery
of live news feeds and stock quotes for critical decision making. As content is transmitted
from the core data center to the client, delays are introduced by the operations of signing
each block at the core data center and transmission delays from core data center to the client.
(2) High per-block processing overhead can severely degrade content playback performance
in devices like PDAs and cell phones with limited memory and processing power. Storage
and computation requirements of verifying a signed block increases the block’s processing
overhead. (3) Loss of blocks can be high when distributing content using non-reliable
transport protocols or through lossy channels like wireless transmission. (4) Available
bandwidth in CDNs is limited. To provide good scalability and reduce transmission delays,
content size should be minimized for a desired quality of service. Placing authenticating
information in each block increases the content size and consequently bandwidth and time
requirements to transmit the content. In the next section, we present a novel signature
amortization technique using trapdoor hash functions that can be used to build efficient
stream authentication mechanisms and overcome the aforementioned challenges.
5.3

Proposed signature amortization technique

In this section we present a novel trapdoor-hash based signature amortization technique that
can be used for authenticating digital streams in CDN’s, multicast systems and peer-to-peer
networks.
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5.3.1

Trapdoor hash-based signature amortization technique

The proposed signature amortization technique works by authenticating the initial block
of a stream using a signature on trapdoor hash of the block’s contents, and authenticating
subsequent block of the stream by finding trapdoor collisions with the hash of the signed
(initial) block. As long as the initial block containing the signature is reliably delivered (and
verified), the verifier can authenticate any block in the stream by matching its trapdoor
hash value with any previously computed trapdoor hash — all blocks in the stream hash to
the same value, and thus, trapdoor hash of any arbitrary block in the stream can be used
for comparison during block verification.
The stream S is denoted as a logically ordered sequence of blocks hp0 , p1 , . . . i. The
contents of each block pi , is denoted by mi . The sender possess a long-term (private,
public) key pair (SK, P K) as well as a (trapdoor, hash) key pair (T K0 , HK0 ). We assume
existence of a public key infrastructure, where each entity is associated with a certificate
signed by a certificate authority (CA) binding the entity’s identity with its public key. The
PKI is responsible for distribution and maintenance of public keys and certificates to all
entities in the system.
The proposed signature amortization technique can be divided into two phases: Stream
signing and stream verification. During the stream signing phase, the sender generates the
authenticating information for each block in the stream as follows:
Initial block generation: The sender generates a signature σ using SK on the trapdoor
hash h0 = T HHK0 (m0 , r0 ) of the contents m0 of first block p0 in the stream. The first
block p0 contains hm0 , r0 , σi.
Subsequent block generation:

To sign subsequent blocks pi (i ≥ 1) with content

mi , the signer generates a collision parameter ri such that T HHKi−1 (mi−1 , ri−1 ) =
T HHKi (mi , ri ) using trapdoor keys T Ki and T Ki−1 . Note that the pairs (T Ki−1 , HKi−1 )
and (T Ki , HKi ), need not be different [cf. Section 3.2]. When ephemeral trapdoor
and hash keys are used, each key pair is utilized for authenticating one block and then
discarded. Block pi contains hmi , ri i and optionally HKi depending on whether an
ephemeral trapdoor key is used for collision computation (i.e., T Ki 6= T Ki−1 ).
During the verification phase, the receiver checks the authenticity of each block in the
stream as follows:
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Initial block verification: When the receiver obtains the initial block p0 of the stream,
it extracts hm0 , r0 , σi from the block, computes h0 = T HHK0 (m0 , r0 ) and verifies the
signature σ on h0 under P K.
Subsequent block verification:

For each subsequent block, pi (i ≥ 1) in the stream,

the receiver parses the received block as hmi , ri i and computes the trapdoor hash of
mi as hi = T HHKi (mi , ri ). It then checks whether hi matches the trapdoor hash
hj = T HHKj (mj , rj ) of the contents mj of an arbitrary block pj that was received
prior to pi . If trapdoor hashes match, the verification is successful. Otherwise, the
receiver sends an error message to the signer and aborts.
5.3.2

Features of the proposed signature amortization technique

We present a brief discussion on security and performance merits of the proposed trapdoor
hash-based signature amortization technique for stream authentication.
Robustness Against Packet Loss: In the proposed technique, to compute the trapdoor
hash value of the contents mi of a block pi (i ≥ 0), the verifier needs to know ri which is
contained within block pi . Moreover, verification of each subsequent block pi (i ≥ 1) depends
on trapdoor hash value of any block pj received prior to pi . Thus, the proposed technique
can tolerate arbitrary loss of blocks in the stream as long as the initial block containing
the signature is reliably delivered to the receiver — any subsequent block can be verified
by comparing its trapdoor hash value with the trapdoor hash value of the initial block.
The proposed technique can use several techniques for reliable delivery of the signature
block including re-transmissions, error-correcting codes, placement of signature in multiple
blocks, or by transmitting the signature using a separate reliable channel [55, 82, 66].
Fast Signing and Verification Rates: The proposed technique requires the sender to
maintain a single block in its buffer, which is used for computing trapdoor collisions for the
current block. Also, since verification of each block is dependent on one other block, the
verifier only needs to maintain content of a single block in its buffer. Thus, the proposed
technique is highly suitable for authenticating real-time and delay sensitive streams, and
resilient against denial of service (DoS) attacks that exploit buffer overflow. Computation
costs at the sender side involve one signature generation for the initial block and one collision
computation for subsequent blocks. At the receiver side, initial block authentication requires
one signature verification, and authentication of subsequent blocks requires one trapdoor
hash computation. Thus, computation costs at sender and receiver side remain constant
per block.
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Constant Per-Packet Communication Overhead: Communication overhead incurred
by the initial block, p0 includes the signature σ and the random string r0 used in the
computation of trapdoor hash of message m0 . Each subsequent block pi contains a random
string (collision result) ri (and an optional ephemeral hash key HKi depending on the
choice of the trapdoor hashing scheme) used in the computation of trapdoor hash of message
mi . Thus, each block incurs constant communication overhead and there is no redundant
placement of the same authenticating material in multiple blocks.
Prevention of Packet Modification: Prevention of content modification using the
proposed signature amortization technique relies on the forgery resistance of the signature
scheme (used during initial packet authentication) and trapdoor hashing scheme possessing
the following properties: (1) Collision forgery resistance; (2) Key exposure resistance; (3)
Semantic Security. The goal of the adversary is to modify contents of an existing block or
insert a new block in the stream so that the malicious block p′i (i = 0, 1, . . . ) in the stream
of blocks hp0 , p1 , . . . i passes the verification procedure at the receiver side. We assume the
channel is insecure and the adversary is able to capture and store contents of all blocks
that comprise the stream. If the trapdoor hash function is collision resistant, creating a
malicious initial block p′0 requires the adversary to forge a signature on the contents of the
malicious block p′0 . Thus, given a collision resistant trapdoor hash function and a forgery
resistant signature scheme, forging an initial block would be computationally infeasible.
Forging a subsequent block p′i (i ≥ 1) in the stream requires the adversary to forge a
collision between trapdoor hash of some previous block in the stream and the contents of
the malicious block. Given a collision resistant trapdoor hash function, collision forgery
is computationally infeasible without knowledge of the trapdoor key. Moreover, by using
key exposure-free trapdoor hash functions we ensure that given a pair of messages whose
trapdoor hash values result in a collision, the adversary is not able to extract the trapdoor
key of the sender.
5.4

A discrete log-based signature amortization scheme, DL-SA

We now present a discrete-log based instantiation of the proposed technique for signature
amortization using trapdoor hash functions.

The proposed scheme uses the trapdoor

hashing scheme DL-MTH described in Chapter 3.
During initialization, given the security parameter λ as input, all entities choose and
agree upon common system public parameters params = hp, q, α, H, Gi, where p and q are
1024-bit and 160-bit primes, respectively, q | p − 1, α is an element of order q in Z∗p and
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H, G : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Z∗q are cryptographic hash functions. The sender’s long-term (private,
public) key pair is given by (SK, P K) = (x, X), where x ∈R Z∗q and X = αx ∈ Z∗p . The
sender’s long-term (trapdoor, hash) key pair is given by (T K0 , HK0 ) = (y0 , Y0 ), where
y0 ∈R Z∗q and Y0 = αy0 ∈ Z∗p .
The stream S is partitioned into segments s0 , s1 , . . . with each segment si containing
multiple blocks pi,0 , pi,1 , . . . . The number of blocks in each segment need not be the same
to accommodate for time-varying generation of streams [82]. However, for simplicity we
assume that each segment contains n blocks
We now consider the authentication of the first segment s0 in the stream containing
the blocks p0 , p1 , . . . , pn−1 (for ease of notation, we drop the subscript indicating the
segment number). During the stream signing phase, the sender generates the authenticating
information for each block in the first segment of the stream as follows:
Initial block generation: The sender generates a signature σ using SK on the trapdoor
hash of the contents m0 of first block p0 in the stream as follows:
1. Choose an ephemeral private key k0 ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral public key r0 = αk0 ∈ Z∗p .
2. Compute the trapdoor hash of m0 as TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) = αhm0 +y0 r0 mod q, where
hm0 = H(m0 ||Y0 ), using its long term hash key Y0 .
3. Solve for t in the equation: t ≡ k0 + xG(TH Y0 (m0 , r0 )||m0 ||r0 ) mod q (this is
the well-known DL-Schnorr [72] signature scheme).
4. Signature on m0 is given by σ = ht, r0 i.
The signer appends σ to the contents of the first block p0 to generate the signed block
p0 = hm0 , σi.
Subsequent block generation:

To sign subsequent blocks pi (i ≥ 1) with content mi ,

the signer computes the following:
1. Choose an ephemeral trapdoor key yi ∈R Z∗q and compute the corresponding
ephemeral hash key Yi = αyi ∈ Z∗p . Store the pair (yi , Yi ).
2. Compute hmi = H(mi ||Yi ) and using trapdoor key y0 and ephemeral key yi ,
solve for ri in the equation: ri = yi−1 (hm0 − hmi + y0 r0 ) mod q.
The signer appends ri and Yi to the contents of the subsequent block pi to generate
the signed subsequent block pi = hmi , ri , Yi i.
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During the verification phase, the receiver checks the authenticity of the each block in
the first segment of the stream as follows:
Initial block verification: When the receiver obtains the initial block p0 of the stream,
it extracts hm0 , σi from the block and verifies σ = ht, r0 i as follows:
1. Look up the long-term hash key Y0 and public key X of sender from a publicly
available directory and store (X, Y0 ). Compute hm0 = H(m0 ||Y0 ).
2. Compute TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) = αhm0 Y0r0 mod q and h = G(TH Y0 (m0 , r0 )||m0 ||r0 ).
3. Compute r ′ = αt X −h mod q. If r ′ 6= r0 mod q, output Invalid and abort.
4. Otherwise, output Valid and store TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) in cache.
Subsequent block verification:

Depending on whether a subsequent block needs to be

individually verified or batch verified along with previously cached blocks, verification
proceeds in one of the two following ways:
Individual block verification:

When we desire individual verification of a subse-

quent block, pi (i ≥ 1), the receiver parses the received block pi as hmi , ri , Yi i,
stores Yi , and verifies pi as follows:
1. Retrieve TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) from cache and compute hmi = H(mi ||Yi ).
2. Compute TH Yi (mi , ri ) = αhmi Yiri mod q.
3. Check whether TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) = TH Yi (mi , ri ). If check fails, output Invalid.
4. Otherwise, output Valid.
Batch block verification:

When we desire batch verification of multiple cached

blocks, pa , pa+1 , . . . , pa+l (l ≥ 2), the receiver parses each the received block pi
as hmi , ri , Yi i, stores each Yi , and batch verifies all blocks in its cache as follows:
1. Compute hmi = H(mi ||Yi ) for i = a, a+1, . . . , a+l and retrieve TH Y0 (m0 , r0 )
from cache.
2. Compute h =

Pl

i=0 hma+i

mod q
Q
Q
r
l
a+i
3. Check whether αh i=0 Ya+i
= li=0 T HY0 (m0 , r0 ) mod q. If check fails,
output Invalid.
4. Otherwise, output Valid.

The procedure is repeated for authenticating blocks within subsequent segments si (i ≥
1) of the stream with the following differences. The signer generates the signature, σi,0 =
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hti,0 , ri,0 i on the trapdoor hash of mi,0 (contents of the first block pi,0 of the segment
si , i ≥ 1) following the initial block generation procedure of DL-SA. To authenticate a
subsequent block pi,j (j ≥ 1), the signer skips step 1 of the subsequent block generation
procedure and computes the collision parameter ri,j of the message mi,j (contained in
pi,j ) as ri,j = yi−1 (hmi,0 − hmi,j + y0 ri,0 ) mod q using the stored trapdoor key yi . The
signer appends ri,j to the contents of the subsequent block pi,j to generate the signed
subsequent block pi,j = hmi,j , ri,j i (that does not contain a hash key). The verifier verifies
the subsequent block using the stored hash key Yi . This repeated use of the (trapdoor, hash)
key pairs (y0 , Y0 ), (y1 , Y1 ), . . . , (yn , Yn ) to authenticate the blocks in subsequent segments of
the stream saves computation at the sender and receiver, in addition to drastically reducing
the per-block communication overhead.
During batch verification of multiple packets pa , pa+1 , . . . , pa+l , the cached blocks need
not be contiguous or sequential (the indices do not indicate the order in which packets
were sent, but instead, only serve to indicate the number of blocks in the receiver’s cache).
Batch verification only requires that the receiver is able to cache blocks regardless of their
logical sequence at the sender and can tolerate arbitrary loss of intermediate blocks and
non-sequential arrival of blocks.
5.5

Analysis of the DL-SA signature amortization scheme

We now present a thorough analysis of the proposed signature amortization scheme DL-SA
including its correctness, security and performance evaluation.
5.5.1

Correctness

The proposed discrete log-based signature amortization scheme, DL-SA is correct if the
initial block p0 and all subsequent blocks pi in the stream pass the verification procedure
at the receiver, provided: (1) All entities honestly choose and agree upon the system public
parameters params = hp, q, α, H, Gi; (2) The sender honestly executes the key generation
algorithm to generate its (private, public) key pair (SK, P K) and (trapdoor, hash) key
pair (T K, HK); (3) The sender honestly executes the initial block signing procedure to
generate σ on trapdoor hash of m0 ; (4) The sender honestly computes the trapdoor collision
parameter ri , and hash value hmi to authenticate each subsequent block pi in the stream.
Proposition 5.5.1. The proposed DL-based signature amortization technique, DL-SA is
correct.
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Proof:

We prove the correctness of the proposed DL-based signature amortization

technique, by showing that the initial packet p0 and subsequent packets pi (i ≥ 1) pass
the verification procedure at the receiver provided the aforementioned conditions hold true.
During verification of the initial signature σ = ht, r0 i on m0 we observe the following:
αt X −h = α(k0 +xh−hx) = αk0 = r0

(5.1)

where h = G(T HY0 (m0 , r0 )||m0 ||r0 ). Thus, σ passes the verification procedure under public
key X.
When a subsequent packet pi containing mi , ri and Yi is individually verified we observe
the following:
TH Yi (mi , ri ) = αhmi Yiri
= αhmi +yi ri
−1

= αhmi +yi yi

(Since ri = yi−1 (hm0 − hmi + y0 r0 ) mod q)

(hm0 −hmi +y0 r0 )

= αhmi +hm0 −hmi +y0 r0
= αhm0 +y0 r0
= TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) mod q
Thus, pi passes the verification procedure at the receiver. What remains to be shown is that
cached packets pa , . . . , pa+l (l ≥ 2) pass the batch verification procedure at the receiver. We
know that for each i ≥ 1, TH Yi (mi , ri ) = TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ). During verification of packets
pa , . . . , pa+l we observe the following:
h

α

l
Y

ra+i
Ya+i

Pl
i=0 hma+i

= α

i=0
hma

= (α

l
Y

r

a+i
Ya+i

i=0
ra+l
ra+1
ra
)
Ya )(αhma+1 Ya+1
) . . . (αhma+l Ya+l

=

l
Y

αhm0 Y0r0

=

i=0
l
Y

TH Y0 (m0 , r0 )

mod q

i=0

Thus, packets pa , . . . , pa+l pass the batch verification procedure at the receiver.
5.5.2

Security

Security of the proposed DL-based signature amortization scheme depends on the following
two factors: (1) forgery resistance of the signature scheme used for signing the initial
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block in the stream and (2) collision forgery, ephemeral collision forgery and key exposure
resistance of the trapdoor hashing scheme used for signing each subsequent block in the
stream. Security of the Schnorr signature scheme against forgery is based on the wellknown Theorem 2.2.1. In Chapter 3 we show that the DL-MTH trapdoor hashing scheme is
collision forgery resistant, ephemeral collision forgery resistant and key exposure resistance.
We now describe an adversarial model that we use to demonstrate that the proposed DL-SA
scheme is secure against adaptive chosen message attack under the discrete log assumption.
Adversarial Model: Consider a game GDLSA
(λ), where λ is a security parameter. The
A
game is played by a PPT adversary A with an honest entity e. The game GDLSA
(λ)
A
is initialized as follows. On security parameter λ as input, all entities choose and agree
upon the system public parameters params. Entity e generates its (private, public) key
pair (x, X) and its (trapdoor, hash) key pair (y0 , Y0 ), and registers (X, Y0 ) in a publicly
available directory. A is provided with the target public key, X and hash key, Y0 of the
honest entity e. The adversary is also given access to a block signing oracle OS that
generates signatures on data blocks that are valid under X and Y0 . The adversary proceeds
adaptively and request the oracle OS for signed data blocks. When A queries OS with input
m, OS returns hm, σi, where σ = ht, ri is a Schnorr signature on h = G(TH Y0 (m, r)||m||r)
that is valid under public key X following the initial block verification procedure of DLSA. When A queries OS with input hp0 , p1 , . . . , pn , mn+1 i, where p0 = hm0 , t0 , r0 i and
pi = hmi , ri , Yi i (i = 1, . . . , n), OS verifies each block following the verification procedures
described in Section 5.4, and if all blocks are valid, returns pn+1 = hmn+1 , rn+1 , Yn+1 i such
that TH Y0 (m0 , r0 ) = TH Yn+1 (mn+1 , rn+1 ).
The goal of the adversary is to output one or more of the following forgeries:
Type I:

A outputs a forged initial block pF0 containing hmF0 , σ F i such that mF0 was never

submitted as a query to OS and σ F = tF0 , r0F passes DL-SA’s initial block verification
procedure under public key X.
Type II:

A outputs a forged sequence of blocks hpF0 , pF1 , . . . , pFn i such that the

following hold:

(1) mFn was never submitted as part of a query to OS ; (2)

F ,Y F i
hpF0 , pF1 , . . . , pFn−2 , mFn−1 i was submitted as a query to OS and pFn−1 = hmFn−1 , rn−1
n−1

was received as a response, and (3) pF0 passes DL-SA’s initial block verification
procedure under public key X, and hpF1 , . . . , pFn i pass DL-SA’s subsequent block
verification procedure under hash key Y0 .
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DLSA (λ), is the probability that A successfully
The advantage of the adversary, AdvA

outputs a Type I or a Type II forgery after proceeding adaptively with oracles OH , OG and
OS . We say that the proposed DL-based signature amortization technique is secure against
DLSA (λ) is negligible for all PPT algorithms A of
adaptive chosen message attack if AdvA

polynomial time complexity in the security parameter λ.
Based on Theorems 2.2.1, 3.4.1, and 3.4.2, we now prove that the signature amortization
scheme, DL-SA is secure against an adaptive chosen message attack.
Theorem 5.5.2. The proposed signature amortization scheme, DL-SA is secure against
adaptive chosen message attack under the discrete log assumption.
Proof:

Given A, we can construct a PPT algorithm B that breaks the discrete log

problem. Algorithm B acts as a simulator that runs A, answering A’s oracle queries, to
convert a successful attack by A on the proposed signature amortization scheme DL-SA into
an attack on the discrete log of a target public key P K = X. B simulates the hash functions
H and G as random oracles OH and OG , respectively, and a stream block signature oracle
OS that answers queries of A.
B chooses a ∈R Z∗q , computes Y0 = X a mod p and assigns X and Y0 as the public key
and hash key, respectively, of an arbitrary entity e. B initializes an empty list MS to store
the queries of A to oracle OS and the corresponding (simulated) responses of B. When
A queries OH with a message m, B returns h if H(m) is defined (that is, ∃h such that
h = H(m)). Otherwise, B chooses h ∈R Z∗q , sets H(m) = h, stores h as the hash entry
for H(m) and returns h to A. Similarly, B simulates responses to A’s queries to hashing
oracle OG (modelling the hash function G). When A queries OS with input m, B does the
following:
1. Checks whether hm, ·i ∈ MS . If so, retrieves that entry, parses it as hm, σi and returns
σ to A.
2. Otherwise, chooses g, t ∈R Z∗q and computes r = αt X −g mod q.
3. Chooses g ∈R Z∗q , sets H(m||r) = h and stores h as the hash entry for H(m||r).
4. Computes T HY0 (m, r) = αH(m||Y0 ) Y0r mod q, sets G(T HY0 (m, r)||m||r) = g and
stores g as the hash entry for G(T HY0 (m, r)||m||r).
5. Stores hm, t, ri at the next available location in MS .
6. Returns ht, ri to A.
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When A queries OS with input hp0 , p1 , . . . , pn , mn+1 i, B does the following:
1. Checks whether hp0 , ·, · · · i ∈ MS (where, p0 = hm0 , t0 , r0 i). If not B returns ⊥
and aborts. B retrieves that entry and parses it as hp0 , p′1 , . . . , p′i i. If i < n the
query is invalid, and B returns ⊥ and aborts. Otherwise, rearrange hp1 , . . . , pn i to
get hp̄1 , . . . , p̄n i such that ∀s < t, r̄s ≤ r̄t (i.e., the pi ’s are arranged in increasing
order of their r component). Similarly, rearrange hp′1 , . . . , p′n i to get hp̄′1 , . . . , p̄′n i. For
j = 1, . . . n, check whether p̄′j = p̄j . If not, query is invalid, and B returns ⊥ and
aborts.
2. If i > n, returns p′n+1 . Otherwise, B chooses hn+1 , rn+1 ∈R Z∗q , retrieves h0 =
−1

−1
r0 rn+1

H(m0 ||Y0 ) and if no such h0 exists aborts. B computes Yn+1 = α(h0 −hn+1 )rn+1 Y0
mod p.

Set H(mn+1 ||Yn+1 ) = hn+1 and stores hn+1 as the hash entry for

H(mn+1 ||Yn+1 ).
3. Concatenates pn = hmn+1 , rn+1 , Yn+1 i to the entry in MS corresponding to hp0 , ·, · · · i.
4. B returns pn = hmn+1 , rn+1 , Yn+1 i to A.
Eventually A outputs a Type I or Type II forgery. When A outputs a Type I forgery of
the form pF0 containing hmF0 , σ F i, this implies that htF0 , r0F i is a forged Schnorr signature
on mF0 . Based on Theorem 2.2.1, B outputs the discrete log x of the target public key
X. When A outputs a Type II forgery of the form hpF0 , pF1 , . . . , pFn i, this implies that one
of the following must hold true: (1) Assume that A submitted m as a query to OS to
receive ht, ri as a response. Also, assume that A submitted hp, m′ i, where p = hm, t, ri,
as a query to OS to receive hm′ , r ′ , Y ′ i as a response. A uses hm, m′ , r, r ′ , Y0 , Y ′ i (where,
T HY0 (m, r) = T HY ′ (m′ , r ′ )) to compute the discrete log y0 of Y0 (performs a key exposure)
and using y0 generates the forged block pFn . (2) A generates the pair hrnF , YnF i such that
T HY0 (mF0 , r0F ) = T HYnF (mFn , rnF ) (i.e., performs an ephemeral collision forgery). In either
case, B computes the discrete log x of the target public key X as x = y0 − a mod q.
5.5.3

Performance

In this section we present an experiment-based performance evaluation of the proposed
scheme, DL-SA. First, we provide a brief description of the system setup used for our
experiments that simulates a wider-scale approach for real-world content authentication.
Next, we describe our approaches for improving the efficiency of the proposed scheme in our
simulations. Finally, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme, DL-SA with the
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WL [82] scheme and the CHFS [71] schemes based on results obtained through our experiments.
We choose the WL and CHFS schemes for comparison as they are the only known signature
amortization techniques in the literature that exhibit features that are comparable to the
proposed scheme, which include, the ability to independently verify each block in the stream
(and thus, are robust against arbitrary loss of intermediate blocks) and the capability to
authenticate real-time streams. Shortcomings of other schemes in providing the independent
verifiability and real-time authentication support are elaborated in Section 2.2.4.
System Set-up: Our performance comparison involves experiments to test the performance of each scheme which include the average per-block signing and verification timings,
the average number of additional bits that needs to be appended to a block to provide
authentication, and the size of the public key (representing the storage overhead) that
is required for verifying the authenticity of each block in the stream.

We conducted

our experiments on a single machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 processor with 6 GiB
RAM running 64-bit Windows(R) 7. For each scheme, we implemented a stream signing
mechanism and a stream verification mechanism using the Java.Security package in Java
Standard Edition 6 using the Eclipse integrated development environment. The signing and
verification mechanisms are each modeled as a class with methods (or subroutines) for the
necessary cryptographic operations.
On a wider-scale test-bed, the signing and verification mechanisms will be implemented
as shared libraries or objects (possibly remote) at the server-side and client-side as part of
the operating system to allow loading the subroutines of a library into multiple applications
at runtime. The approach of using shared libraries for content authentication is similar to
Microsoft’s Authenticode(TM) technology for the Internet Explorer that is used for signing
and verifying executable software distributed over the Internet. The flexibility provided
by dynamic linking of shared libraries will permit multiple flavors of server-side CDM
software and client-side stream playback software to utilize the authentication mechanism.
Another alternative is to implement the stream authentication procedure as an extension
to the transport layer protocols that are used to packetize the stream before transmission.
However, this approach only permits signing a stream at the time of transmission and does
not allow offline signing (for non-real time generated streams) and storage of a signed stream
for future replay (or for caching). An application layer approach (using shared libraries)
to signing and verifying content provides more flexibility compared to a transport layer
mechanism.
In our experiments, we represent the content as a large file (between 50 to 100 MiB
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in size) that is given to an instance of stream signing class as input during runtime. A
method in the signing class splits the file into blocks of equal length, groups the blocks into
equal sized segments and stores the blocks in a two-dimensional array, where each column
of the array represents a segment containing multiple blocks. This array of blocks is given
as input to the block signing method that outputs the signed blocks which are, in turn,
stored in a two dimensional output array. To simulate transmission losses, random entries
in the array of signed blocks are replaced with a null value. Next, the array of signed blocks
(representing the signed stream) is given as input to an instance of the stream verification
class that verifies each block in the array. Our system setup of using Java classes to represent
the stream signing and verification mechanisms is a sufficiently accurate simulation of a realworld deployment scenario and is adequate for the purposes of performance analysis.
Speed-up of DL-SA: In the DL-SA scheme, exponentiation is the most expensive operation
required to sign and verify each block. The exponentiation operations can be sped up
using the Lim and Lee (LL) technique [51] and the simultaneous multi-exponentiation [60]
at the expense of requiring the sender and receiver to store pre-computed values. For an
exponent e of size 160-bits and a base α of size 1024-bits, the standard square-and-multiply
technique requires 240 multiplications on average. In contrast, the LL method requires only
24 multiplications to compute αe with storage of 1020 1024-bit values (which equates to
127.5 KiB). For fixed bases α1 , α2 , . . . , αk , the simultaneous multi-exponentiation technique
can be used to efficiently compute αe11 αe22 · · · αekk using 299 multiplications with storage
of 2k values (the pre-computation requires (2k − 2) multiplications, but only needs to be
performed once).
We employ the LL and simultaneous multi-exponentiation techniques to optimize the
cost of computing exponentiations and thus, improve the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Depending on how the optimization techniques are used, we obtain two variants of DL-SA.
The first variant (called the DL-SA.1) uses the LL technique for all exponentiation operations
at the sender and receiver. The second variant (called the DL-SA.2) uses LL technique
to compute exponentiations at the sender, the LL technique to compute exponentiations
during individual block verification and simultaneous multi-exponentiation during batch
verification of blocks.
Performance Comparison: Table 5.1 shows the performance comparison of both variants
of the proposed scheme against the WL and CHFS schemes. Our test-bed is used to simulate
each scheme. In Table 5.1, the term x denotes the cost of modular exponentiation with
160-bit exponent in the DL-based cryptosystem, e denotes the cost of RSA encryption
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Table 5.1: Performance comparison of proposed signature amortization scheme, DL-SA with
existing schemes.
Scheme

Sig.
Size
(Bits)

Signing Cost

Opns
WL.1 [82]

704

WL.2 [82]

1152

CHFS [71]

2320

DL-SA.1

160

DL-SA.2

160

0.06d +
1.94h
0.06d +
1.94h
0.03d +
349.22h
0.03x +
1h
0.03x +
1h

Timing
(ms)
0.39
0.02
1.74
0.03
0.03

Verification Cost

Individual
Opns
Timing
(ms)
0.06e + 0.01
0.88h
0.06e + 0.01
0.88h
184h
0.83
2.06x +
1h
2.06x +
1h

0.21
0.21

PK
size
(Bits)

Batch
Timing
(ms)
N/A
N/A

1024

N/A

N/A

2048

N/A

N/A

720

0.06x +
l+1
x+h
l
0.06x +
2.49
x+h
l

0.16
0.11
0.11
0.09

Opns

to

1024

to

1024

(i.e., modular exponentiation with 16-bit exponent), d denotes the cost of RSA decryption
(i.e., modular exponentiation with 1024-bit exponent), h is the cost of cryptographic hash
computation and l is the number of blocks that are batch verified in the proposed DL-SA
scheme (3 ≥ l ≥ 32 for DL-SA.1 and 20 ≥ l ≥ 32 for DL-SA.2). All computation, storage and
communication costs are based on a security benchmark of 1024-bits.
For the WL scheme, we divide the stream into blocks of 1024-bytes in size, group 16 blocks
into a segment, and amortize a signature over each segment as suggested by Wong et al. [82].
The first variant WL.1 uses the RSA signature scheme and the second variant WL.2 uses the
eFFS signature scheme [82]. For the CHFS we divide the stream into blocks of 240-bytes in
size, group 32 blocks into a segment, and use 36-time key pairs to amortize a RSA signature
over each segment as suggested by Rohatgi et al. [71]. The signature size represents the size
of the authenticating information contained in each block. Signing and verification costs
represents the average cost for signing and verifying each block. The columns showing the
number of operations required to sign and verify each block contain only the most significant
(expensive) operations. For the DL-SA scheme, we assume that each segment contains 32
blocks, each of size 1024-bytes. The signature size corresponds to subsequent segments. All
public keys necessary to verify the entire stream are transmitted in the first segment using
an additional 1024-bits per block and not transmitted for subsequent segments.
The performance analysis shows that the DL-SA scheme incurs the smallest per-block
communication overhead and provides the fastest block signing rates compared to the WL
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and CHFS schemes. Although both variants of the WL scheme provides faster verification
compared to the proposed scheme, they suffer from several problems which include variable
communication overhead per-block, the inability to support authentication of multiple
simultaneous streams, and introducing sender-side delay to maintain reasonable costs
(see [71] for details). The DL-SA scheme does not suffer from any of the drawbacks of
the WL scheme. The most efficient variant of the WL scheme, WL.2 uses the largest secret key
(131072-bits) and the largest public key compared to the other schemes. The CHFS scheme
also overcomes all drawbacks of the WL scheme but incurs more overhead compared to DL-SA
in terms of signing cost, verification cost and per-block signature size. The DL-SA scheme
provides the best balance between features and performance compared to both WL and CHFS
schemes.
5.6

Summary

Mechanisms of stream authentication in content distribution networks help prevent
masquerading attacks and malicious modification of content during transmission. However,
efficient authentication of live, on-demand content is a challenging task and requires
fast signing and verification, tolerance against transmission loss and small per-block
communication overhead. We presented a novel trapdoor hash-based signature amortization
technique that meets these challenges to provide efficient authentication of delay-sensitive
and real-time streams in content distribution, multicast and peer-to-peer networks. Our
signature amortization technique works by authenticating the initial block in a stream
using a signature on the trapdoor hash of the block contents and authenticating subsequent
blocks of the stream by finding trapdoor collisions with the hash of the signed initial block.
We demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed technique to build practical instances by
presenting a discrete log-based instantiation of the proposed technique called DL-SA. The
DL-SA scheme was designed to allow both individual verification of a single block in the
stream or batch-verification of multiple blocks to reduce the average verification cost per
block. We provided a detailed analysis of the proposed scheme including its correctness,
security and performance. We demonstrated that the DL-SA scheme incurs the smallest
per-block communication overhead and provides the fastest block signing rates compared
to existing stream authentication schemes of Wong et al. [82] and Rohatgi et al. [71] that
also provide the ability to independently verify each block in the stream.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion and future work

6.1

Thesis contributions

In this dissertation, we presented authentication schemes that can be used to secure
distributed applications against various threats, including malicious manipulation of data,
and adversaries masquerading as legitimate entities. To this end, we developed techniques
to construct proxy signatures and signature amortization schemes using trapdoor hash
functions. The proposed proxy signature scheme is designed to authenticate agents acting
on behalf of users in agent-based computing systems. The proposed signature amortization
scheme is designed to authenticate each block comprising a stream in content distribution
systems. Our performance analysis shows that for a desired level of security, the proposed
schemes outperform previous schemes, both in computation cost, and communication
overhead. To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• The goal of this dissertation is to present new techniques to build various authentication schemes that use the collision finding property of trapdoor hash functions
to authenticate messages. Our motivation for using trapdoor collisions for message
authentication stems from the following observation: When a trapdoor hash function
is used within a hash-then-sign signature scheme, it permits the party with knowledge
of the trapdoor to re-use the signature value to authenticate other messages of choice
by finding collisions between the hash of the original signed-message and the new
message that needs to be signed. To achieve our goal, we developed a key-exposure
and collision-resistant discrete log-based trapdoor hash function that, unlike existing
trapdoor hashing schemes [3, 4, 26, 44, 74], is suitable for use as a building block to
construct authentication schemes that use the process of computing hash collisions
using a trapdoor key, rather than generating conventional signatures using a secret
key, to authenticate messages. The proposed scheme is designed to ensure that it
is computationally infeasible for a third party to compute additional hash collisions
with the knowledge of a message pair whose trapdoor hash values are equal. The
proposed scheme is resistant to collision forgery and key exposure under the discrete
log assumption. The proposed scheme is more efficient compared to existing key82

exposure-free trapdoor hashing schemes in terms of computation overhead during
trapdoor hash and collision computation.
• Agent-based computing is a popular approach for designing large-scale and complex
distributed systems [40]. Agents are software instances that can be delegated by a
user (individual or a company) to carry out operations on its behalf. To secure agentbased computing systems against malicious attacks, users have to establish trust
relationships with agents which includes their security, reliability, availability, and
business continuity guarantees. Moreover, sensitive information stored and processed
by agents need to be protected from exposure, alteration and corruption. We study
the problem of providing efficient authentication of agents in agent-based computing
environments. To this end, we proposed a simple and elegant technique to construct
provably secure proxy signature schemes using trapdoor hash functions that can be
used to authenticate and authorize agents acting on behalf of users in agent-based
computing systems.

Unlike most common proxy signature schemes [13, 47, 43],

the proxy signing key pair is not derived from the delegator’s signature during the
proxy delegation phase. Instead of generating a signature on the message in the
traditional sense, the proxy uses its trapdoor key (known exclusively to itself) to find
a trapdoor collision between the trapdoor hash of the warrant and the given message.
We demonstrated the effectiveness of our approach for creating practical instances
by constructing a discrete log-based instantiation of the proposed generic technique,
called the DL-TPS scheme. The DL-TPS yields superior performance in terms of proxy
signature verification among the schemes in [13, 39, 43, 47, 57, 69, 83] and produces
the smallest proxy signatures compared to schemes in [13, 43, 47, 48, 57, 69]. The
proposed scheme is resistant to forgery attacks under the discrete log assumption.
• In networks designed to distribute content, mechanisms for stream authentication
can help prevent malicious modification of content during transmission and attacks
where adversaries masquerade as legitimate content providers to distribute malicious
content.

Efficient authentication of live and on-demand content requires fast

signing and verification, tolerance against transmission loss and small per-block
communication overhead.

We developed a novel trapdoor hash-based signature

amortization technique that meets these challenges to provide efficient authentication
of delay-sensitive and real-time streams in content distribution, multicast and peer-topeer networks. The basic idea behind the proposed signature amortization technique
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is to authenticate the initial block of a stream using a signature on the trapdoor hash
of the block contents and authenticate subsequent blocks of the stream by finding
trapdoor collisions with the hash of the signed initial block. We also constructed a
discrete log-based instantiation of the proposed technique, called DL-SA. The DL-SA
scheme allows both individual verification of a single block in the stream or batchverification of multiple blocks to reduce the average verification cost per block. The
proposed scheme is secure against forgery attacks under the discrete log assumption.
The proposed scheme incurs the smallest per-block communication overhead and
provides the fastest block signing rates compared to existing stream authentication
schemes of Wong et al. [82] and Rohatgi et al. [71] that also provide the ability to
independently verify each block in the stream.
6.2

Future research directions

Future research work on topics covered by this dissertation can proceed along the following
three directions: (1) Studying the feasibility of building additional forms of signatures using
trapdoor hash functions; (2) Further improving efficiency of proposed trapdoor hash-based
signature schemes; (3) Building practice-oriented security proofs for the proposed signature
schemes.
6.2.1

Building additional forms of signatures using trapdoor hash functions

The proposed trapdoor hash-based authentication techniques are all based on the idea of
replacing traditional hash functions in signature schemes with trapdoor hash functions and
authenticating new messages by finding a collision with a previously signed message using
a trapdoor key. This general idea can be applied to develop additional forms of digital
signature schemes.
We are currently in the process of developing an aggregate signature scheme using
trapdoor hash functions. The paradigm of signature aggregation allows combining multiple
signatures into a single condensed signature, whose verification simultaneously establishes
the validity of all component signatures. Depending on the type of message each participant
signs, condensed signature schemes can be classified into multisignature and aggregate
signature schemes. An aggregate signature scheme involves compression of n signatures
σ1 , . . . , σn , where each σi is a signature on a distinct message mi under public key
P Ki , into a single aggregate signature σ on messages m1 , . . . , mn that can be verified
under public keys P K1 , . . . , P Kn . On the other hand, a multisignature is an aggregate
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signature generated on a common message. Both multisignature and aggregate signature
schemes can be constructed in a sequential [54] or non-sequential manner [14]. Condensed
signatures offer bandwidth and storage savings, and are usually more efficient to verify
compared to verifying all component signatures individually. Due to these advantages,
condensed signatures have found numerous applications like, securing multicast feedback
acknowledgement [19, 22], securing ad hoc routing [21, 42], authenticating delegates in
mobile code systems [75], securing path-vector routing protocols [23, 41, 84] and building
efficient certificate chains [54].
Assume a trapdoor hashing scheme that allows multiple entities to compute collisions
with a given hash value.

Intuitively, the method for producing trapdoor hash based

aggregate signatures exploits the general practice of generating signatures on hashes of
messages (rather than on the message itself). By replacing traditional hash functions with
trapdoor hash functions in the signature generation process, each signer participating in
the aggregate signature scheme can find collisions between hashes of different messages.
Thus, by using trapdoor collisions among the different messages that each participant
signs, each signer can produce signatures on a common hash value that can be combined
using a multisignature construction technique to produce the resulting aggregate signature.
This is because, as noted earlier, multisignatures are essentially aggregate signatures with
the restriction that each signer signs the same message, or rather, the same hash value.
This method for constructing aggregate signatures represents a significant departure from
traditional aggregate signature construction techniques and can provide researchers with
new opportunities to built novel aggregate signature schemes that can take advantage of
various existing multisignature construction techniques to achieve the desired efficiency and
scalability needs. For instance, the multisignature by Micali et al. [61] outperforms all
known aggregate signatures in terms of computation overhead for signature generation,
aggregation and verification.
6.2.2

Further improving efficiency of proposed trapdoor hash-based signature
schemes

The schemes proposed in this dissertation demonstrate improved performance over existing
schemes in the literature. The discrete log-based instantiations of the proposed generic
techniques serve as the first step in building efficient authentications schemes.

The

proposed generic techniques allow the use of any type of digital signature and trapdoor
hashing schemes provided that the security properties of the constituent schemes meet
the requirements described in this dissertation. Future implementations of the proposed
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generic techniques can use primitives from various cryptosystems and new constructions of
signature and trapdoor hashing schemes to further enhance the efficiency of the proposed
trapdoor hash-based authentication schemes.
One technique to further improve the performance of the proposed schemes is through
the use of linear feedback shift register (LFSR)-based cryptosystems to develop new
instantiations of the proposed techniques. An nth order LFSR is an electronic switching
circuit with n storage units regulated by a clock that causes the content of each storage
unit to shift to the next unit in line with each clock pulse. Traditionally, LFSRs have
been used to generate key streams in stream ciphers. More recently, Gong et al. [35] and
Lenstra et al. [50] have proposed the use of LFSR to build public key cryptosystems. LFSRbased cryptosystems use reduced representation of finite field elements and extremely fast
sequence operations to provide substantial savings of communication and computational
overhead for a desired level of security. For instance, the XTR cryptosystem [50] uses 340bit keys to provide security equivalent to a DL-based cryptosystem that uses 1024-bit keys.
Moreover, sequence operations in XTR is three times faster than modular exponentiations
in the DL-based cryptosystem [22, 21, 23].
We have used LFSR-based cryptosystems in the past to build efficient and scalable
multisignatures [22, 21], aggregate signatures [23], blind signatures [20] and proxy
signatures [25].

Future implementations of the proposed techniques can use LFSR-

based cryptosystems to achieve performance improvements over the discrete log-based
instantiations presented in this dissertation.
6.2.3

Building practice-oriented security proofs for the proposed signature
schemes

In this dissertation we use the complexity theoretic framework to formalize the security
proofs of the proposed authentication schemes. The proposed security proofs use probabilistic polynomial time adversaries, polynomial time transformations and show that the
adversary succeeds in breaking the proposed scheme with negligible probability. Although
such proofs form a good baseline to demonstrate the security of our schemes, their impact
in practice is limited. Practitioners can better judge the security of a scheme when provided
with data like the number of cycles of adversarial computations a scheme can withstand,
minimum key size (or parameter size) needed to withstand attacks, and so forth.
Future work on the proposed schemes can involve refining the security proofs by taking
a practice-oriented approach [9] where one can attempt to present quantitative results
regarding the security of the proposed authentication schemes. Future security proofs
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can place quantitative bounds on the success probability of an adversary in breaking the
proposed schemes. The success probability can be expressed in terms of quantifiable values
such as the number of oracle queries made by the adversary, the amount of time an adversary
computes, the key length (or the parameter length).
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